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Introduction 
One of the main distinguishing features of the Brazilian labor market is its impressively 
high job and worker turnover rates. Even though turnover rates are very high for all 
workers, the literature has presented evidence that the contribution of some 
demographic groups, especially young workers, is quite significant to the observation of 
such high turnover rates in Brazil.  
On the other hand, it is well-known that many workers face major obstacles to enter the 
labor market when they are young. There is ample evidence that unemployment rates 
for the 16-24 year-old age bracket are much higher than for other age groups, that young 
workers disproportionately hold informal and/or precarious jobs, such as temporary 
employment (Betcherman et al. 2007), and that they are taking most of the burden in 
many countries following the 2008 financial crisis (Bell and Blanchflower, 2010; 
Biavaschi et al. 2012). 
Hence understanding what drives the attachment of young workers to formal jobs seems 
to be a promising path to reduce both youth turnover and unemployment rates. In this 
study we tackle the issue of turnover and labor market attachment of young workers 
from two perspectives.  
We first document statistics on jobs and worker flows in Brazil, illustrating that youth 
workers display much higher turnover rates than other age groups. Yet in this first 
perspective we investigate whether this is an intrinsic characteristic related to the low 
age of these workers or whether this is a spurious relation due to other turnover 
determinants which may be correlated with age. 
The second perspective is to evaluate the impact of a large youth-targeted program, 
which was substantially increased in 2000, on the formal labor market attachment of its 
participants. The program is Lei do Aprendiz (Apprentice Act), a targeted active labor 
market program conducted by the Labor Ministry, which concedes payroll subsidies to 
firms that hire and train young workers under temporary contracts. 
Following a suggestion by one of the referees of the first report, this final report is 
organized as two different papers, each focusing on one of the perspectives described 
above.  
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Abstract 
We use matched employer-employee data to study the situation of young workers in the (formal) labor 
market in Brazil. We employ the flow approach to draw a comparative picture of the patterns of the 
young and adult movements in the labor market during a period of fifteen years. We also estimate an 
econometric model that attempts to isolate the contribution of workers’ age on employment duration. Our 
results show that youths experience very high rates of labor market turnover, a phenomenon that comes 
from elevated rates of hiring and separation from jobs. The estimates from the model show that the age of 
workers does contribute to decrease employment duration, with or without the inclusion of firm-specific 
fixed effects. In terms of policy, a decline in the separation rate may be attained through a combination of 
policies that involves the education system and labor market initiatives that create incentives for workers 
and firms to invest in each other.  
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1. Introduction 
One of the most worrisome and widespread stylized facts in Labor Economics is the 
observation of very low employment rates for young workers, usually resulting in very 
high unemployment rates. For instance, ILO estimates the youth global unemployment 
rate at 12.6% in 2011 (ILO 2012). But in some countries the figures are much higher as 
indicated by the OECD-average youth unemployment rate of 18.5% in the third quarter 
of 2010 (OECD 2010). 
Brazil is no exception for this matter. According to a nation-wide household survey 
(PNAD/IBGE) the unemployment rate for 15-24 year olds was 16.3% in 2011, while 
the rates observed for ages 25-49 and 50+, were 5.7% and 2.8%, respectively, in the 
same year.  
The main goal of this paper is to provide a more complete picture of labor market 
integration of young workers in Brazil. We use the flow approach as advocated by 
Blanchard and Diamond (1992) as the ideal setting to analyze labor market dynamics. 
The implementation of this approach is based on worker flow measures such as hiring, 
separations and turnover computed both for young and adult workers. We use a 
Brazilian matched employer-employee dataset (RAIS) from 1996 to 2010 to pursue all 
the empirical analysis. 
The collection of results on new dimensions of youth labor market contributes to a more 
accurate diagnostic of the youth labor market problem. Before describing briefly our 
results it is worth mentioning two methodological contributions of this paper. The first 
one is a measurement procedure that identifies how much of young workers separation 
is due to adult workers crowding-in. The second one is the strategy used here to identify 
the age effect on employment duration, which is based on a hazard model with 
establishment fixed effects. 
Our first results confirm larger flows for young workers than for adult workers. Perhaps 
the most striking result is the average turnover rate which amounts to 1.65 for youth 
workers, twice as large as the adults’ figure. Also important is the fact that hiring rates 
are relatively higher than separation rates for young workers. 
In general, low employment rates for young workers can occur either because of a low 
entry flow into employment or from a high exit flow from employment. Our results are 
  
consistent with the latter scenario, where a high exit flow (separations) from 
employment resulting from large turnover rates is probably the main determinant of 
high unemployment rates for young workers in Brazil (Flori, 2004, has provided some 
previous evidence on this).  
The pattern of separations for young workers reveals two interesting findings. The first 
is that most replacements of jobs held by young workers are filled by other youths. 
Indeed, on average, less than 10% of all replacements of young workers are 
substitutions for adult workers. Similar results are observed in the other direction, i.e. 
the replacement of adults by young workers. This is compatible with a view in which 
young and adult labor enter the aggregate production function in (almost) fixed 
proportions.  
The second interesting finding is the difference between youths and adults as reason for 
separation from a job. While lay-offs account for a higher share for adults, voluntary 
quits and the expiration of temporary contracts are relatively more important for 
younger workers. This is probably due to a combination of a more unstable labor supply 
behavior of youths and more frequent use of time-limited contracts to hire them.  
Regarding the other component of turnover, namely the hiring rate, we investigate 
whether the high separation rate observed for youths could be attributed to attachment 
to high turnover jobs. We calculate the relative share of hirings for temporary contracts 
and for jobs at cooperatives, the latter typically considered quite unstable. Though we 
confirm that the use of temporary contracts is relatively more important for youths than 
adults, the difference does not seem to explain the more elevated separation rate for the 
former group. Jobs at cooperatives represent a negligible fraction of hirings, so it cannot 
explain the magnitudes observed for the separation rate. 
Other job dimensions may be relevant to explain high flow rates for younger workers. 
In the last part of the paper, we address whether the high flows computed for young 
workers (in particular the high turnover rate) is an intrinsic characteristic of the lower 
age of these workers or, rather, whether it is a spurious relation due to other turnover 
determinants which may also be correlated with age. We take particular attention to 
establishment characteristics as we present evidence that young workers tend to be 
allocated to high turnover jobs. We use two complementary methods: a variance 
decomposition based on firm and worker characteristic and an econometric hazard 
model. The estimation of a hazard model including firms fixed effect as well as firms’ 
  
and individuals’ observable characteristics suggest that a lower age increases the hazard 
of separation even taking into account firm and worker controls.  
Apart from this introduction, the paper contains six sections. In the second, we present 
the related literature and some labor market trends for youths based on stock measures. 
The third section describes the data and set out the basic flow measures used in the 
paper. In the fourth section, we look at the patterns of hirings in an attempt to check 
whether the higher separation rate observed for youngsters could be due to an allocation 
in which they start off from high turnover jobs. Section five contains a deeper look at 
differences in the pattern of separations between the groups. In section six, we use 
statistic and econometric models as an attempt to better measure the role played by 
workers’ age in explaining the patterns of the job flow measures analyzed in the 
previous sections. The last section offers some conclusions. 
2. Preliminaries 
2.1. Related literature 
The bulk of the literature on youth labor market relies on the analysis of stock 
variables computed from household surveys. Typically, the unemployment rate is the 
main indicator used in such analyses. We start this section by summarizing the stylized 
facts unveiled by the analysis of stock variables.  
Freeman and Wise (1982) is recognized as an influent piece of work for 
understanding the underlying forces behind the youth labor market problem. Based on 
the collection of results in the volume the editors conclude that “Aggregate economic 
activity was the major determinant of the level of youth jobless in the United States”. 
Another important conclusion was that “severe employment problems were 
concentrated among a small proportion of youths with distinctive characteristics”. 
The volume by Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) validates both conclusions for a 
more recent period (the 1990s) and a broader set of developed countries. The results 
were further extrapolated by O’Higgins (2003), who analyses the labor market for 
youths in developing and as well as transition economies. The qualitative results are 
broadly in agreement with those found for developed countries.
1
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 A notable exception is the more prominent role of supply factors in developing countries. 
  
An important stylized fact specific to developing countries is the overrepresentation 
of young workers in the informal sector. See for instance Saavedra and Chong (1999). 
This is also studied in Maloney (1999), who associates this pattern to the finding that 
the informal sector tends to be the entry door for young workers in the labor market. 
A somewhat related trend of using non-standard jobs as an entry door for young 
workers has been documented recently for EU countries with respect to temporary 
contracts. Evidence on this can be found either in O’Higgins (2012) or in OECD (2012). 
Both studies mention that the use of such contracts to hire youths increased in the last 
decade and carried on into the recent economic downturn. 
The recent economic downturn also motivated novel contributions claiming that 
young workers are relatively more sensible to negative economic shocks. See for 
instance Bell and Blanchflower (2011) and O’Higgins (2012). 
Another minor part of the literature proposes a different track to analyze the youth 
labor market problem. This track set the stage for the flow approach. Leighton and 
Mincer (1982) can be considered the turning-point contribution that inaugurates this 
new track. The authors decompose the unemployment rate by age group in 
unemployment incidence and duration. They show that the difference in unemployment 
rates between the groups is mostly due to differences in unemployment incidence. 
Leighton and Mincer (1982) also emphasize labor turnover as the most important 
dimension for analyzing the relationship between age and unemployment. 
Following the same track O’Higgins (2001) focuses on unemployment duration. The 
author claims that short unemployment spells tend not to be harmful for young workers’ 
prospects in labor market, but long term unemployment is.
2
  
As higher unemployment duration can be a consequence of either a burst in 
separations or a drop in hirings, the flow approach arises as a natural direction to 
understand the youth labor market problem. This is the direction that we pursue in this 
paper. 
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 O’Higgins (2001) also argues that analyses based on unemployment are particularly problematic for 
early ages due to the ambiguous attachment of youths to the education system. Increases in 
unemployment induced by higher enrolment in schooling could be viewed as a good outcome instead of a 
bad one. 
  
2.2. Youth Labor Market Trends based on stock measures  
Before presenting our flow analysis based on Brazilian matched employer-
employee data, we will briefly report in this section some evidence that the Brazilian 
labor market does not depart from the general trend summarized above. In particular we 
want to see if the trend of higher unemployment and higher informality for youths 
appear in the Brazilian household surveys. Throughout the paper, youths are all workers 
younger than 24 years old (inclusive) and adults are all workers above that threshold 
age. 
This section only we rely on the main Brazilian household survey (Pesquisa Nacional de 
Amostra por Domicílios - PNAD
3
) to be able to measure the unemployment and 
informality rates. The unemployment rate is computed following the standard ILO 
definition, while informality rate is defined as the share of employed workers in one of 
the following categories: i) informal salaried worker, ii) self-employed, iii) non-salaried 
worker. We use data from 1996 to 2011, a period which comprises two distinct phases 
of the Brazilian labor market. Before 2003 both unemployment and informality showed 
either upward trends or stagnation at a relatively high level. Later there is a sharp 
declining trend on both indicators. 
Indeed, youth labor market indicators differ sharply from the adult ones 
regarding informality and unemployment. Figure 1 below shows that: while the 
unemployment rate for adult workers fluctuated between 5% and 7% over the fifteen 
years we cover, the unemployment rate for young workers was 2 to 3 times higher, 
ranging from 13% to 21%. The informality rate is also much higher for youngsters. The 
share of informal workers peaked in 2002 at 34% for adult workers and at 52% for their 
younger counterparts. Both age groups benefited from the formality trend of the second 
part of the 2000’s. But the lowest informality rate of 37% over the period for young 
workers, in 2011, was still well above the 26% observed minimum for adult workers in 
the same year. 
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 PNAD is a repeated cross-section with annual frequency, has national coverage and is conducted by the 
IBGE, the Brazilian Census Bureau. 
  
Figure 1 – Unemployment and informality rates for age groups 
Source: Authors´ estimates based on 
carried out in Census years (2000 and 2010).
 
In sum, the Brazilian labor market does seem to follow the general trend 
for other developing countries
youths than for adults.  
 
3. Worker flows: the contrast between young and adult workers
3.1. Basic Measures and Data
Our main data source come
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4
 The absence of tax evaders from the sample prevents us from claiming tha
on all Brazilian establishments. Rather, RAIS gathers information o
sector”. 
– 1996
PNAD/IBGE data. The nationally representative survey is not 
 
 of both higher unemployment and informality
 
 
s from a Brazilian administrative database (
RAIS) which is maintained by the Brazilian Ministry of
– MTE
.
4
 
 
t the data include information 
n what is typically called the “
-2011 
 
documented 
 rates for 
Relação Anual 
 
). In Brazil, all 
formal 
  
RAIS provides matched employer-employee longitudinal data similar to those available 
in developed countries.
5
 The data include worker specific information (such as gender, 
age and schooling), establishments (such as location and industry), and contract 
information (such as contracted wages, working hours, types of contract, hiring and 
separation dates, and reasons for separation). In our analysis we make intensive use of 
the last set of variables. 
Our results rely on information on hirings and separations between 1996 and 2010 to 
compute traditional measures of worker flows, adapted to the context of age specific 
groups. We calculate the hiring and separation rates for age group a in year t as: Hat= Σi 
hiat/Xat and Sat=Σi siat/Xat, respectively, where i represents establishments, hiat is the 
number of hires of workers of age group a over the course of the year t, siat is the 
number of separations for age group a over the year t at establishment i, and Xat is the 
aggregate average (between 31/12/t and 31/12/t-1) employment level of the group of 
workers under consideration.  
These two rates can be combined to provide evidence on turnover. First, we aggregate 
the overall amount of worker flows using the worker turnover rate: Tat= Hat + Sat. The 
more heterogeneous is the workers’ flow profile within firm × age cell, the higher is the 
distance between turnover and any of its components. Following this insight, another 
interesting measure is the churning rate, which is defined as CHat= Tat – |NETat|, where 
NET stands for net employment growth. 
The context of age specific groups matter to the way labor flow measures are computed. 
In the traditional analysis at the firm level, NET could be either computed as:
6
 
NETt= Ht – St,    (1) 
or as: 
NETt=Σi ∆nit/Xt. 
However when dealing with age specific groups, the two measures differ from each 
other due to individuals crossing the threshold that divides adjacent age groups while 
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 See Abowd and Kramarz (1999) for a description of the countries where this type of database was 
available and for information on how labor economics research has benefited from such databases. 
6
 Abstracting from inconsistencies in information provided by firms on stocks and flows. 
  
continuously employed in the same business unit i. These individuals do contribute to 
age group specific employment stock variation (∆n), but do not contribute neither to 
hiring (H) nor separation (S) rates. Hence we will rely on the first procedure and 
compute NET as in expression (1). 
 
3.2 Youth Labor Market Trends based on flow measures 
The striking differences between flows measures of young and adult workers are 
summarized in a single graph (Figure 2), where we plot H (vertical axis) and S 
(horizontal axis), elaborating on Burgess et al. (2001). There are large difference in 
these flow measures between the two groups, with both hiring and separations rates 
higher for youths. This implies that the turnover rate for young workers overtakes that 
for adult workers.  
Figure 2 also shows a higher net employment rate for young workers. Points along the 
45
o
 line corresponds to NET=0, as H=S. The scatter points for adult workers are either 
around or a little above the 45
o
 line, a pattern which evinces a small, positive average 
net employment growth for this group in the period of analysis. Net employment growth 
increases northwest with respect to the 45
o
 line. ‘IsoNET’ lines are also plotted in 
Figure 2, indicating the different combinations of H and S that yield 10, 20, and 30% net 
employment growth rates. Differently from the adults’ pattern, the net growth rates for 
young workers tend be spread along the 20% IsoNet line. This shows that, on average, 
youths experience a much higher employment growth rate than adults in the formal 
labor market in Brazil. Figure 3 confirms that and shows that the growth rates have 
exhibited a slight increasing trend for both groups over the period of analysis.
7
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 It is interesting to note that this pattern of formal-sector employment growth based on RAIS is 
consistent with the patterns for the unemployment rate based on PNAD and described in section 2.2. 
  
 
Figure 2: Hiring and separation rates by age group, 1996
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS
 
Table 1 summarizes the time series of each group flow indicators. The Table initially 
reports the average value for the 
rates (T and CH) for both age groups for the period 1996
that both the hiring and separation rates were higher for younger workers. Table 1 
brings the magnitude of such 
hiring rate for youths (92.6%) is more than two times higher than the average hiring rate 
for adults (42.8%). This indicates that Brazilian youths do not seem to face problems to 
get jobs in the formal labor market in the country. The difference in separation is a little 
less pronounced but still of considerable magnitude. Indeed, the figure for youths is as 
high as 72.4%, while it amounts to 41.3% for the older group (1.8
 
-2010 
/MTE data. 
hiring rate (H), the separation rate (S), and the turnover 
-2010. From Figure 2 we knew 
difference. The first striking result is that the average 
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Figure 3: Net employment growth rate by age group, 1996
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS
 
The comparison of turnover rates adds these two differences and provides the second 
striking result. Turnover rates 
and 84.1% for adults. The rate of 1.65 for youth
younger worker transitions into and from formal employment for each five employed 
young workers, on average, each year. 
international standards (see, e.g., Davis
Santos, 2006). Given the behavior of net employment growth rates mentioned above, 
the churning rate for youngsters decreases more than that for adults (with respect to the 
turnover rates), but the ratio between the two churning rates is still around 2. 
From Figure 2 we can see that the hiring and separation rates for young workers are 
more disperse over time than the corresponding ones for adults. In order to take that into 
account, we calculated the coefficients of variation (CV), which are also present
Table 1. The interesting finding brought by the CV calculation is the reversal of the 
order of the comparison of the hiring and separation rates between the two groups. 
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Indeed, when the dispersion in the rates is incorporated, the differences between the 
groups become higher for separations (CV of 0.095 for youths and 0.069 for adults, 
ratio of 1.4) than for hirings (CV of 0.096 for youths and 0.084 for adults, ratio 1.1). 
One possible interpretation for this is that young workers flows, particularly hiring 
rates, are relatively more affected by the business cycle. 
 
Table 1: Summary of flow indicators by age group, 1996-2010 
  H S T CH 
Youths 
      Average 0.926 0.724 1.651 1.448 
  CV 0.096 0.095 0.094 0.137 
  CORR GDP 0.708 0.563 0.652 0.563 
     Adults 
      Average 0.428 0.413 0.841 0.823 
  CV 0.084 0.069 0.074 0.059 
  CORR GDP 0.555 0.405 0.505 0.429 
     Ratio Youth/Adults 
      Average 2.2 1.8 2.0 1.8 
  CV 1.1 1.4 1.3 2.3 
  CORR GDP 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS/MTE data. H: Hiring rate; S: Separation rate; T = Turnover 
rate (T=H+S); CH= T - |H-S|. CV is the coefficient of variation. Corr GDP represents the simple 
correlation of each variable with GDP.  
 
Table 1 allows us to check how close is the association between the business cycle and 
the age-specific labor flows. The rows Corr GDP in the Table display the correlation 
coefficient between each flow measure and the GDP. The correlations confirm that the 
flow measures for young workers are more sensitive to business cycle than the ones 
computed for adult workers (correlations for the former group are around 30 to 40% 
higher than that of the latter group).  
The results presented in this section indicate that young workers do not seem to face 
strong barriers to formal labor market entry in Brazil. The lowest value of the hiring rate 
was 80%, its average amounted to more than 90%, and in three years (2007, 2008, and 
2010) it surpassed 100%. But, though jobs are relatively easy to get, they are also riskier 
to lose. Indeed, the figures show that separations rates are also very high for youths: 
  
minimum of 65%, average of more than 70%, and in two years (2008 and 2010) it was 
above 85%. As a result, young workers end up experiencing very high levels of labor 
market turnover. On the one hand transiting across many different jobs may enhance 
better matching with firms. On the other hand, entering and leaving jobs very easily 
tend to depress the acquisition of general and firm-specific labor experience. Since the 
accumulation of this type of human capital is important, the elevated turnover 
experienced by youths in Brazil is a factor that hinders the increase in their (future) 
productivity and wages. 
 
4. A closer look at youth hiring rates: the role of unstable jobs 
Hirings and separations from jobs are not necessarily independent events. For instance, 
in a developing country like Brazil, there is a large share of jobs of inferior quality (low 
wages, temporary contracts, unsatisfactory working conditions etc.) which are easily 
filled by the large share of less qualified workers available in the country. As they do 
not retain workers for long periods, high levels of hirings and separations are a common 
feature of this kind of jobs. If youths’ hirings are overrepresented in this type of jobs, 
then at least part of the high levels of separations we observe for them comes from the 
high levels of hiring to unstable jobs. In order words, high separation rates could be 
induced by entrance “through the wrong door”. 
In order to investigate this possibility, we explore some features available in our data to 
check whether or not younger workers are overrepresented in some types of jobs that 
tend to have higher degree of instability. Specifically, we will look at the proportion of 
temporary jobs or jobs at cooperatives in hiring episodes involving young workers. 
Figure 4 shows the share of hirings in temporary contracts for young and adult workers. 
Two points stand out from this Figure. First, the share of temporary contracts is much 
lower in Brazil than what is reported for EU countries: while the share for Brazilian 
young workers never reached 13% between 1996 and 2010, the figure is close to 43% in 
the case of EU countries (O’Higgins, 2012). Second, despite the similar values at the 
beginning of the period, the share of youths hired for temporary jobs rose, while the 
corresponding share for adults did not change much. In part, the rise observed for 
  
youths can be attributed to the increased use of the apprentice contract, which was 
launched by the government in 2000.
Another form of unstable jobs often pointed as partly responsible for downgrading labor 
relations in the country are jobs offered by cooperatives
share of youths and adults that were hired by cooperatives between 1996 and 2010. The 
main point to notice from this Figure is that the fraction of the age groups hired by 
coops during this interval was less than 1%, that is, almost 
do not seem to contribute to 
workers. 
 
Figure 4: Share of hirings in temporary contracts by age group, 1996
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS
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 See Corseuil et al. (2013) for an evaluation of the effects of the apprentice
market outcomes. 
10
 Since 1994, cooperatives have been exempted from paying many types of labor taxes. Many argue that 
this exemption has incentivized the creation of
other firms only because they can “formally” hire workers without paying taxes. While we can identify 
cooperatives in the data, we cannot distinguish whether or not they behave in this counterfeit 
9
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In summary, the evidence presented in this section shows that the pattern of hiring
young workers either in temporary contracts or cooperatives
responsible for the relative higher separation rate observed for this group. Further 
investigation seems necessary to check whether this connection from higher hiring to 
higher separation in fact exists and, if so, how it operates, especially for young workers.
We focus on separation rates themselves in the next section.
 
Figure 5: Share of hirings by cooperatives by age group, 1996
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RAIS
 
5. Looking for the determinants of higher separation rates for youths
In this section, we look deeper at the separation rate for young workers. Our data allow 
us to investigate three important dimensions of separations. First, 
between what we call permanent and 
separations are relatively more motivated by one of three reasons: the voluntary 
decision of the worker to quit the job, the decision of employers to lay
or the simple expiration of a temporary contract. 
separations of young workers from their jobs result in 
substitution of the young worker 
 does not seem to be 
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transitory separations. Second, 
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a job destruction or the 
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we distinguish 
we see whether 
-off the worker, 
  
5.1. Permanent versus transitory separations
Our first distinction is between 
the Brazilian labor legislation induces fak
hiring and a separation of the same worker by the same firm within a certain period of 
time. In order to minimize the effect of this “double” countin
separation rate for age group 
that were not reverted at firm 
defined as: S
t
at=Sat- S
p
at, where S
Figure 6: Permanent and temporary separation rates by age group, 1996
Source: Authors’ estimates based on RAIS/MTE data.
 
Figure 6 displays the figures for the two types of separations for youths and adults. As it 
can be seen, both rates are higher for the younger group but the permanent rate is 
relatively higher for adults (it represents on average almost 3/5 of all separati
for youths (account for around half of all separations on average). While transitory 
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 One cited example is the situation where the employee negotiates a fake dismissal with the employer so 
that the worker can receive the unemployment benefit for some months and access the accumulated 
amount in his/her individual severance payment 
the (negative) incentives embodied in the Brazilian labor legislation.
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separations do increase turnover rates, the sheer magnitude of permanent separations 
rates of about 34% (always larger than 30%) confirm the volatile attachment of younger 
workers, compared to older workers. Permanent separations for adult workers are lower, 
at about 24% and never higher than 28%. 
In order to analyze in a more structural fashion the differences in separations between 
our groups of interest, the rest of this section will be based on the measure of permanent 
separation. 
 
5.2. Quits versus layoffs 
Figure 7 shows that lay-offs are the most important reason for separations for both age 
groups. The Figure also shows that, though they have lost some importance over time 
for both groups, lay-offs are more relevant as a cause of separation for adults than for 
young workers. In fact, this difference has doubled over the years, rising from 6 p.p. in 
1996 to 12 p.p. in 2010. The decline in the share of lay-offs was initially compensated 
by an increase in the contribution of expiration of temporary contracts but towards the 
end of the period there was a rise in the share of voluntary quits. It is worth observing 
that the termination of temporary contracts and quits are more relevant for youths than 
for adults and these differences have increased over time between the groups. 
A set of factors can explain what we observe in Figure 7. First, as temporary contracts 
are relatively more relevant as a means to hire youth labor (see Figure 4), it is not 
surprising that separations due to the expiration of this type of contract are relatively 
more important for this group. Also, in the last two decades, labor legislation 
encouraged the use of more flexible forms of contracts (e.g. temporary jobs, part-time 
jobs, and temporary lay-offs) in many countries. This has not been different in Brazil, a 
fact that can explain the increase in this form of separation at least in the first part of our 
period of analysis. 
  
  
 
Figure 7: Share of Separations by Proposer, 1996
Source: Authors’ estimates based on RAIS/MTE data.
 
Another factor is associated with the labor supply behavior of youths, who tend to 
“shop” jobs around more than adults. This can explain why quitting is more pre
among the former group. In addition, as workers respond to the prevailing economic 
conditions, the supply side can also explain why we observe increases in the 
contribution of voluntary leaving for both types of workers in years of economic 
expansion. Firms may also have different sensitivities to dismissing adult and young 
workers over the economic cycle. We saw evidence of that in section 3, so at least part 
of the rise in the difference between the groups in the contribution of lay
attributed to the distinct response of firms to the last economic cycle in Brazil.
5.3. Job destruction versus worker substitution
This subsection is based on 
occurs it can ensue what we term 
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position. Second, when a substitution does take place, the worker can be replaced by 
another worker of same age (within substitution) or by a worker from a different age 
group (between substitution). We will decompose the separation rate in these three 
categories. 
Let JDat= Σi ∆niatI(∆niat<0)/Xat be the job destruction rate for age group a, where i 
represents firms, t the year, and I(.) is the indicator function that assumes value one 
when its argument is true and zero otherwise. Similarly, let JCat= Σi ∆niatI(∆niat>0)/Xat 
be the job creation rate for age group a in year t.  
We define the within age-group substitution rate as the difference between the 
permanent separation rate and the job destruction rate for age group a: Wat = S
p
at – JDat. 
The between age-group substitution rate is defined as: Bat = min{JCa’t * xa’,a; JDat}, 
where a’ denotes a different age group from a and xa’,a = Xa’t/ Xat.
13
 Finally, we can 
define what we call the effective job destruction rate for group a at time t: EJDat = JDat - 
Bat. The interpretation of these concepts is that from all separations that occurred for age 
group a in the economy, part resulted in the substitution of workers from the same age 
group, part in the substitution of workers from another age group and the rest is 
attributed to what would be the effective destruction of the job occupied by workers of 
group a. 
14
 
Perhaps the most interesting result revealed by Figure 8 is the low degree of substitution 
between youths and adults. Indeed, the share of substitution of one type of worker for 
the other is on average 4% and never surpasses the 5% level over the entire period of 
analysis. Though a more in-depth analysis would be needed, these low figures give an 
indication that young and adult labor enter the aggregate production function almost in a 
fixed proportion fashion. Figure 8 also reveals that substitution within the same age 
category is more common for youths than for adults, with a difference in shares of 
around 6 p.p. for the former group. It is also noticeable that replacement within the same 
age group became more important across the years for both groups. Indeed, there was a 
rise of more than 10 p.p. for youths and adults when we compare the share of within 
substitution in last half of the 1990’s with the last half of the 2000’s. The opposite 
                                                 
13
 The inclusion of the ratio xa’,a is for compatibility with the denominator of the other rates. 
14
 It may be easily seen that Sat=Wat+Bat+EJDat. 
  
movement happened with the share of separations due to job dest
this may be explained by the response of workers and firms to the economic cycle.
Figure 8: Share of Separations by Type: Job Destruction and Substitution Within or 
Between Age Groups, 1996
Source: Authors’ estimates based on
 
In sum, the evidence presented in this section shows that: permanent separations are an 
important fraction of separations for youths, voluntary quits and the 
limited contracts are relatively more relevant for youths tha
form of replacement of youths is not a substitution by an adult but a substitution by 
another worker of the same age group. 
(particularly lay-offs and job destruction) 
business cycle. Although a deeper investigation would be needed to reach a clearer 
understanding of these findings, it is quite likely that  demand, supply, and institutional 
factors, played their role in explaining the 
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jobs were intrinsically higher. If so, the higher turnover rates 
workers may be a consequence of 
young workers may be allocated to high turnover industries, like construction or retail 
trade. Figure 9 below confirm
rates across industries in our data.
Figure 9 - Labor 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on RAIS/MTE data.
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metrics are calculated for cells defined by a combination of the following 
characteristics: industry, workers’ age, establishments’ age, establishment size and 
year.
15
 These measures are then regressed against a series of dummies for the 
characteristics according to the following model.  
Ya,j,k,m,t = αa + β j + δ k + θ m + λ t + εa,j,k,m,t, 
where Ya,j,k,m,t represents a measure of either job or worker flow computed for the cell 
defined for worker of age “a”, industry “j”, plant age “k”, size “m”, and year “t”. In the 
right hand side we have the terms capturing the effects of each of these variables, plus a 
cell idiosyncratic non-observable component.   
Table 2 below presents the variance decomposition results for each job and worker flow 
measure. The Table reports the explanatory power of each characteristic, measured as 
the characteristic mean square divided by the regression mean square. We use mean 
squares instead of just squares in order to control for the higher explanatory power of 
characteristics with more degrees of freedom. Characteristics that explain twice the 
regression mean square are highlighted in gray. 
 
Table 2 – Worker flow metrics within- and between-characteristics variance 
decomposition 
  Year Worker age Firm size Firm age Sector 
NET 0,48 10,32 0,09 10,38 0,03 
H 0,58 8,34 0,18 9,84 0,17 
S 0,18 7,78 0,13 2,21 0,88 
T 0,61 5,49 0,29 7,01 0,56 
CH  0,10 10,64 0,23 0,59 0,68 
d_firma 0,86 6,93 0,57 0,23 0,54 
df 14 3 7 1 25 
Source: Authors calculations based on RAIS/MTE data. H = Hiring rate; S = Separation rate; T = 
Turnover rate (T=H+S); NET=Net Employment Growth (NET=H-S); Churning rate (CH=T – |NET|)). Df 
– characteristic degrees of freedom (number of categories minus one). Cells measure the ratio between 
the characteristic mean square and the explained mean squares. Characteristics mean squares are 
measured comparing residual sum of squares with and without the variable group (Anova 
decomposition). Gray cells indicate characteristics with twice the regression mean square. 
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 We use three age categories (14-17; 18-23 and 24-60), seven firm size categories (0-4; 5-9; 10-19; 20-
49; 50-99; 100-249; 250-499; and 500 and more workers), two firm age categories (up to 4 years of age; 
five years or more) and twenty five industry classifications (roughly following national accounts, subsetor 
ibge). The industry classification is coarse due to the many classification changes over the period. 
  
The results indicate that the workers age generate the sharpest difference across cell 
flow measures. Other characteristics are relevant (and significant), but with smaller 
explanatory power. Business unit age seems more important than industry and firm size. 
Business cycle variation has relatively small explanatory power, a result that contrast 
with one of the stylized facts in the literature, namely the dominant role of business 
cycle to explain youth unemployment. Therefore, there seems to be an important role 
for cell idiosyncratic non-observable characteristics in explaining job and worker flow. 
This is further explored in the next section. 
 
6.2. Estimation of hazard models 
The decomposition above can be considered an illustrative first step in trying to isolate 
the intrinsic contribution of age to turnover. But the challenging identification problem 
remains as the results on the previous section cannot be used “prima facie” to address 
this question. The reason is that age may be associated either to individual 
characteristics or unobservable job characteristics. For instance, it has been previously 
shown in the literature that young workers accumulate less human capital
16
, a finding 
that can be associated with high turnover.  
An ideal setting to tackle this issue is to analyze longitudinal worker level data that 
carries information on the establishment that hosts his job. At this level, we can analyze 
the determinants of employment duration considering both individual and job 
characteristics. 
The standard econometric procedure to study duration events is the estimation of hazard 
models. Our previous discussion suggests that such estimation should be able to take 
into account idiosyncratic characteristics on top of observable characteristics. We chose 
to use the following proportional hazard model specification with fixed effects: 
hij(t) = α.Dij + β.Xij + γj (t) ,  (2) 
where hij(t) denotes the logarithm of the hazard rate of worker i completing her 
employment spell at establishment j at a length t. Dij are workers age-group dummies, 
and Xij are observable characteristics of workers and establishments (to be detailed 
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 See, for instance, Farber (1998) and references therein. 
  
below). These variables are measured at the start of the corresponding employment 
spell. The term γj(.) is the baseline hazard function of the employment spells. As we use 
a Cox version of the proportional likelihood estimator, there is no need to specify any 
parametric form for the baseline hazard.  
The key departure of our specification from conventional proportional hazard models is 
to allow variations of the baseline hazard across establishments.
17
 This takes into 
account any non-observable specificity at the firm level that may affect the hazards of 
its employees, even if such specificity is also correlated with any other observable 
characteristic.
18
 This strategy enhances the credibility of our identification strategy as 
does the inclusion of a fixed effect term in conventional regression models with panel 
data.
19
 As mentioned before, workers with similar observable characteristics could have 
different separation rates because of heterogeneity across firms in unobservable 
characteristics (like manager tolerance with either worker performance or behavior in 
the workplace). Allowing establishment idiosyncratic effects as specific baseline hazard 
rates allows us to compare workers that are in the same establishment (and therefore 
subject to the same idiosyncratic factors). This information is delivered by the 
parameter α, which informs how the hazard rates vary among similar workers in the 
same firm by age group. 
As pointed out by Chamberlain (1985) we can use partial likelihood (PL) methods to 
get rid of γj(.) and estimate the model without further complications. Allison (1996) 
shows that such estimator, which he refers as fixed-effect partial likelihood, performs 
very well with simulated data despite Chamberlain’s concerns with the validity of one 
assumption for PL methods in the context of duration models.
20
   
                                                 
17
 Another important departure from duration models with longitudinal data is that we do not have 
multiple spells of the same individuals, but rather multiple workers of the same establishment, where each 
worker contributes with a different spell within the same establishment. 
18
 Allowing such possible correlation is not a standard procedure in the economics literature using hazard 
models. These non-observable specificities, when incorporated, are usually treated as independent from 
all observable covariates.  
19
 As a matter of fact, the following model specification with an additive fixed-effect component, 
analogous to conventional regression models using panel data, is a special case of our model: 
hij(t) = αj + δ.Dij + β.Xij + γ(t). 
20
 Specifically, Chamberlain pointed that in the context of multiple spells for each individual the 
censoring time for the last spell depends on the lengths of the preceding spells. This would violate a 
necessary condition for the implementation partial likelihood methods. In addition to Allison’s 
 
  
For the analysis of hazard rates, we use all episodes of hirings that took place in the 
period from 1996 to 1998. We measure the employment spell following the worker-
establishment match until one of three restrictions occurs: i) the match is broken and the 
establishment keeps employing other workers, ii) the establishment leaves the market 
(or at least disappears from RAIS), and iii) the match survives until the last year of our 
data (2010). If the match faces one of the two last restrictions we classified the 
employment spell as a censored one.  
As in other applications using RAIS data, we apply some filters. First, we eliminate 
separation episodes that resulted from individual death or retirement. We also exclude 
from the analysis employment spells that satisfy, at the initial point, at least one of the 
following conditions: worker aged 55 or older, in agriculture, in the public sector, or 
under a temporary contract. These procedures leave our sample with 27,162,416 
employment spells. For each employment spell we collected information on workers 
age, gender, schooling level, and contractual number of hours. 
In order to get more intuition from the results, we present two alternative specifications 
for the hazard model: the first includes plant fixed effects and the other does not. Table 
3 below presents the results. The first three rows report the results for the effect of 
distinct age categories on the hazard rate relative to the base age category of over 30 
years old. The first thing to notice is that the dummies for young ages (14 to 17 and 18 
to 23 years old) are associated with positive and significant coefficients, in both 
specifications. This confirms that hazard rates are higher for young workers. However it 
is interesting to point the non-monotonic effect of workers age on the hazard rate. Late 
young workers (18 to 23) are associated with the highest hazard, irrespective of the 
model specification. 
  
                                                                                                                                               
downgrade in this issue, in our case there is no particular reason to believe that a worker’s employment 
spell will be influenced by the ones of his colleagues. 
  
 
Table 3: Hazard estimations for the separation of a worker from the current employer  
Parameter Coefficients Std Errors Coefficients Std Errors
[14-17] 0.06839 0.00190 0.13461 0.00154
[18-23] 0.09718 0.0008832 0.16531 0.0007722
[24-30] 0.04727 0.0008430 0.06041 0.0007701
very low education 0.16722 0.00155 0.69838 0.0009425
low education 0.10209 0.00121 0.27499 0.0008598
medium education 0.06648 0.00116 0.09331 0.0008985
man 0.01825 0.0009346 0.01230 0.0006907
part-time 0.06070 0.00239 -0.13722 0.00158
1996 -0.04523 0.00141 -0.06877 0.00122
1997 -0.03690 0.0007298 -0.03153 0.0006214
plant fixed-effect no plant fixed-effect
Note: 
Very low education: First half of primary education 
Low education: Second half of primary education (but not complete) 
Medium education: Completed primary education or incomplete secondary education 
Part-time: Work 30 hours or less per week 
Basel categories: women older than 30 years, highly educated that was hired in 1998. 
 
Also interesting is the comparison across specifications of the estimated values of the 
coefficients for the first two age categories. The introduction of establishment fixed 
effects has similar impacts on the estimated coefficients of these two age categories. 
The effect for the 14 to 17 years of age group (relative to the base category of older than 
30) decreases from 0.135 to 0.068 as we add establishment fixed effects. This 0.07 
difference between the two specifications, almost doubling the coefficient, represent 
around half the initial estimate and it is also observed for the 18 to 23 category, for 
which it represents around 45% of the initial estimate. This common pattern suggests 
that both “teen” (14 to 17) and late young workers (18 to 23) tend to be allocated in 
high turnover establishments, relative to older workers. 
The remaining rows in Table 3 report the estimated coefficients of the control variables 
in each one of the two specifications. An analysis of the estimated values for these 
coefficients can be grouped into three categories according to how the effect changes 
across model specifications. Firstly, the effect of education is also reduced once we add 
establishment fixed effects. In fact, the magnitude of this reduction is even higher than 
the one registered for age. We should point out however that, despite this reduction, the 
magnitude of the effect of education is still very high. Moreover, as it can be seen, the 
lower the education level of the worker, the higher the impact on turnover. Secondly, 
  
the effect of gender is stable across model specifications. Finally, the effect of working 
under a part-time contract not only increases once we add establishment fixed effects, as 
it flips sign, becoming positive. 
 
 7. Concluding comments 
Using a rich employer-employee dataset we were able to draw an overall picture of how 
youths have performed in the formal labor market in Brazil in a recent period of 15 
years. Based on the flow approach, we show that both the hiring and the separation rate 
for this group are quite high both in absolute and relative terms. The average figures for 
the hiring and separation rates for youths are over 90% and 70%, respectively, leading 
to an impressive turnover rate of more than 160%, twice the value observed for adults. 
Though it may induce better matching with firms, such a high level of turnover tends to 
hamper the accumulation of firm-specific experience, which can be an important form 
of human capital. A lower level of productivity can result, producing negative impacts 
at both the individual and the aggregate levels.  
We look deeper at each component of the turnover rate. Potentially, an elevated hiring 
rate has both a positive and a negative side. On the one hand, it makes it easier for 
youths to get a job but, on the other, it generates less incentive to keep them. This last 
force induces job separations and therefore diminishes the duration of employment. In 
addition, if youth hirings are concentrated in unstable jobs, even higher levels of 
separations are expected. Our initial empirical investigation of the connection from 
hirings to separations was able to find some evidence that youths do not seem to be 
particularly allocated to more unstable jobs (temporary contracts or cooperative jobs).  
Looking at job separations patterns, we found that quits are more prevalent among 
young workers than among adults. As mentioned, this can be associated with the high 
hiring rates of the former group. But it can also be associated with the supply behavior 
of youths, which typically involves more “shopping” across jobs in the labor market. 
We also found evidence that separations due to the expiration of temporary contracts are 
relatively more important for youths than for adults. The results also show that this 
cause of separations increased for both groups during the 2000’s, a phenomenon that 
may have to do with the introduction of incentives to use more flexible forms of labor 
contracts. Finally, we also found that a considerable fraction of separations do not end 
  
up in job destruction but rather in the replacement of one worker for another. In 
particular, the results evince that the more prevalent form of substitution is not across 
workers of different age groups but between workers of the same group. 
Going one step further, we investigated to which extent one can say that the high 
turnover measures for youths can be attributed to their younger age. In other words, we 
conducted some exercises to isolate the contribution of the workers’ age from that of 
other factors. This was carried out through two exercises. The first was a statistical 
model that tried to separate out the relative importance of age to explain the variation 
observed in various flow measures we used throughout the paper. The second was an 
econometric model of duration that tried to isolate the contribution of age on the 
duration of employment. Establishments’ unobserved characteristics were incorporated 
in this last model. The results from both types of models show that to some extent the 
age of the worker contributes to explain the higher turnover rates and the lower 
employment duration observed for younger workers. 
Condensing these results for policy purposes, the main empirical result is that young 
workers experience very high rates of turnover in Brazil due to both hiring and 
separation rates. In order to make the turnover rate decline, the main margin of policy 
attention should be the separation rate. Indeed, though hirings and separations are 
interrelated, tackling the problem of high levels of separations looks more efficient in 
the sense it directly attempts to keep workers longer in their jobs. The high hiring rates 
does not credence a lack of jobs for youth. Rather, the high separation rates imply short 
lived unstable jobs. 
One must firstly recognize that other factors apart from the age of individuals operate. 
In particular, as the results of section 6 show, the education of workers seems to be an 
important factor to decrease turnover. In this sense, the more the education policy 
accelerates the increase in the schooling level of the new cohorts of workers, the lower 
should be the turnover expected for them. 
Labor market policies should also be part of the strategy to lower the separation rate. 
Probably, job search assistance initiatives cannot do much, unless they are capable of 
generating worker-firm matchings that produce longer employment durations. Providing 
wage or tax subsidies for firms to extend the tenure of youths should be thought very 
carefully in particular because its costs can become very high. One could also devise a 
system that creates incentives for young workers and firms to increase the value of 
  
longer job relationships. Finally, training programs partially funded by the worker and 
the firm may create incentives for both parties to invest in each other in the longer term. 
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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the Apprenticeship program (Lei do Aprendiz) 
that has been adopted in a large scale since 2000 in Brazil. This is a youth-targeted 
ALMP, which concedes payroll subsidies to firms that hire and train young workers 
under special temporary contracts aiming to help them to successfully complete the 
transition from school to work. We make use of a longitudinal matched employee-
employer dataset covering the universe of formally employed workers, including 
apprentices. Our identification strategy exploits a discontinuity by age in the eligibility 
to the Apprenticeship program. We examine the program impacts in terms of wage 
growth and attachment to the formal labor market using other temporary workers as a 
control group. We find that the program increases the chances of getting relatively 
better paid and more stable jobs, especially in the medium run – four and five years 
after the program.  
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 1. Introduction 
It is well-known that many workers face major obstacles to enter the labor market when 
they are young. There is ample evidence that unemployment rates for the 16-24 year-old 
age bracket are much higher than for other age groups,2 that young workers 
disproportionately hold informal and/or precarious jobs, such as temporary employment 
(Betcherman et al. 2007), and that they are taking most of the burden in many countries 
following the 2008 financial crisis (Bell and Blanchflower, 2010; Biavaschi et al. 
2012).3 These facts brought youth employment to the forefront of recent policy debate 
with an increasing number of countries adopting youth-targeted active labor market 
programs (ALMPs) with a predominant focus in training (OECD, 2010).4 
The general message from the literature is that there is substantial variation across 
countries and regions in the effectiveness of youth-employment policies, reflecting the 
large diversity of labor regulations, institutional arrangements for educational and 
training systems, and the relative importance of the informal sector.5 The main 
challenges for the youth to successfully complete the transition from school to work are 
mostly influenced by institutional factors, such as the format of general education and 
vocational training systems, as well as regulations and existing ALMPs (Biavaschi et al. 
2012). The role of the informal sector in providing training for young workers has also 
been recognized as an essential characteristic of labor markets in developing countries 
(Betcherman et al. 2007).  
                                                 
2 In 2009, the ratio of young workers’ unemployment rates (15-24 year old workers) over aggregate 
unemployment rates for a large sample of countries was around 2. The following ratios were observed in 
2009: 2.04, on average, for the OECD countries; 2.14, on average, for UE-15; 1.9 in the U.S.; 2.09 in 
Brazil; 1.93 in Mexico; 2.3 in Chile; 1.8 in Colombia (OECD, 2010).  
3 In Brazil, according to the national household survey (PNAD), the unemployment rate for 15-24 year 
olds reached 18.9% in 2009, while the rates observed for ages 25-49 and 50+, were respectively, 7.1% 
and 3.7%. These rates are similar if one considers a longer period: the respective averages for the three 
age groups for the 1992-2009 period were 17.1%, 6.6%, and 3.6%. 
4 The main justification for having ALMP’s targeted to young workers is based on evidence of “scarring” 
effects of early unemployment and job-loss experiences (see Eliason and Storrie, 2006; Skans, 2011; 
Nilsen and Reiso, 2011; and Cruces et al., 2013 for recent studies on this issue). The literature has 
increasingly stressed the importance of the early years in a worker’s career, a period in which workers 
make important human capital accumulation decisions that may be affected by the fact that young 
workers are probably the most vulnerable group to economic fluctuations (Adda et al., 2013). On the 
other hand, some youth-targeted ALMP’s may not be optimal, especially those that aim reducing turnover 
through increasing rigidities, given a tendency of young workers to experiment new job matches which is 
not only natural but also desirable from an efficiency point of view. 
5 Adda et al. (2013), for instance, provide evidence that young workers were less hit by the Great 
Recession in countries with better designed vocational training institutions, like Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland. 
By contrast, the number of reliable evaluations of youth-targeted ALMPs is still 
relatively small, especially in low and middle-income countries. Despite a recent 
increase in the number of studies using randomized experiments and other methods to 
deal with non-random selection of participation, more efforts devoted to evaluating the 
effectiveness of youth-targeted programs are clearly needed as well as the additional 
task of identifying which components of each program are important in each context. 
The main goal of the paper is to evaluate a very large youth program, the 
Apprenticeship program (Lei do Aprendiz) that has been adopted in a large scale since 
2000 in Brazil. This is a youth-targeted ALMP conducted by the Brazilian Labor 
Ministry, which concedes payroll subsidies to firms that hire and train young workers 
(aged 14-17 years from 2000 to 2005; 14-24 years since 2005) under special temporary 
contracts. The program intends to provide professional skills to young workers and help 
them to successfully complete the transition from school to work. Its main objective is 
to place participants in formal first jobs with adequate specialized training that increases 
their employability at the beginning of their labor market careers (Ministério do 
Trabalho e Emprego, 2009). 
We use a very large restricted-access administrative dataset that has information on the 
whole history of formal jobs for millions of Brazilian workers: the Relatório Anual de 
Informações Sociais (RAIS), collected by the Labor Ministry. RAIS is a longitudinal 
matched employee-employer dataset covering by law the universe of formally employed 
workers, including apprentices hired under the Apprenticeship program. The use of 
RAIS provides a rare opportunity to observe careers of young workers from the starting 
point in a developing country.6 
A crucial issue for evaluation is to define what a successful youth-targeted training 
program is. The aim of this type of program is usually associated with achieving a better 
labor market integration of the young labor force (Biavaschi et al. 2012). The choice of 
the appropriate counterfactual depends, however, on the context of each program. In 
developing countries, for instance, informal and/or temporary jobs are a common first 
                                                 
6 A recent review of the literature stresses that “…research into the effects of vocational training and 
related ALMPs would benefit enormously from the availability of better data and a suitable program 
design allowing for the proper evaluation of policy initiatives. Regarding data, the generation of 
representative survey data, in particular longitudinal data with a full set of individual characteristics, is 
essential” (Biavaschi et al. 2012). An example for a developed country is Adda et al. (2013) who uses an 
exceptionally rich data set based on social security records from 1975 until 2004 for male workers in the 
former West Germany.  
step into the labor market. Given the low quality of schools, productivity signals of 
young people with low education are very imprecise and access to good formal jobs is 
often restricted to more educated workers. Most employers are thus reluctant to 
formalize contracts with young workers without previous experience and referrals from 
former employers.7 This creates a vicious circle for these workers who do not get formal 
job offers because of no previous experience, which is hard to attain because of no job 
offers.  
It has been argued that an informal first job in this context may help break this cycle by 
providing training and productivity signals to formal employers.8 Cunningham and 
Salvagno (2011) show that young people in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico typically 
spend a short time in the informal sector after school before moving to longer spells in 
formal jobs. That is, having an informal first job seems to not preclude a later long-term 
attachment to the formal labor market. The same could also be expected for flexible 
arrangements such as fixed-term contracts that are common in countries with rigid labor 
legislation, especially for low-education workers. The crucial question is whether these 
types of entrance jobs provide young workers with the skills needed to make progress in 
their future careers.  
Brazil is known for its rigid and imperfectly enforced labor legislation which results in a 
large number of informal jobs (Almeida and Carneiro, 2012; Gonzaga, 2003), as well as 
for the bad quality of its primary schools and the low level of education of most of its 
young workers. Therefore a youth-targeted program that focuses on providing 
professional skills in subsidized entry-level formal jobs seems to be an adequate ALMP 
in this context. If well designed, it has the potential to be an attractive substitute for 
other entry-level alternatives such as temporary or informal jobs.  
The discussion above suggests defining a successful program as one that eventually 
leads to better paid and more stable jobs, compared to other temporary or informal jobs. 
Biavaschi et al. (2012) argue that “compared to fixed-term contracts, without training, 
                                                 
7 Another evidence of this high uncertainty in hiring young workers in developing countries is the 
enormous level of turnover for this age group observed in Brazil (Corseuil et al., 2013). 
8 This is a well-known phenomenon, but in a country like Brazil it usually results in equilibrium with 
large rates of school dropouts and very low formal employment rates. The low levels of education tend to 
perpetuate this problem, acting as a barrier to investment in training by eventual employers given its very 
low expected returns. The result is a labor market with a large number of workers trapped in low-paying 
jobs, mostly informal, with a very little chance of promotion and future real wage increases. 
apprenticeships are better temporary contracts as they include systematic training and 
favourable prospects for subsequent job promotion, wages and employment stability”.  
We evaluate the Apprenticeship program by estimating its impact on some labor market 
outcomes of young workers. The treatment group is composed of young workers that 
started their careers in the formal sector as apprentices. Following the line of reasoning 
above we use as a control group workers of the same age that had other formal 
temporary contracts as first jobs in the same periods. Note that our dataset does not 
allow us to use workers with informal first jobs as a control group since we only 
observe workers with formal contracts. 
We examine how the Apprenticeship Act program affects the career prospects of these 
young workers, in terms of degree of attachment to the formal labor market and wage 
growth. More specifically, we estimate the impacts of the program on: i) formal 
employment probability (overall and for non-temporary jobs); ii) measures of 
experience in the formal labor market (accumulated number of hours and months in 
formal sector jobs; probability of staying in the same firm or occupation); iii) measures 
of turnover (accumulated number of admissions and dismissals; probability of quits); 
and iv) real hourly wages. The analysis is carried on both for the short (2-3 years after 
the program) and the medium run (4-5 years after the program). 
Since participation in the program is endogenous, the challenge is to deal with non-
random selection based on unobservables as in most papers of the literature. Our 
identification strategy exploits a discontinuity by age in the eligibility to the 
Apprenticeship program. From 2000 to 2005, only individuals aged 14 to 17 years old 
could participate in the program. Individuals aged 18 years old or more were not 
eligible. This corresponds to the partially-fuzzy regression discontinuity setting 
discussed in Battistin and Rettore (2008), in which workers aged above a cutoff value 
cannot, and in fact do not, participate in the program, yet there is imperfect compliance 
for those below the cutoff. 
We use three different estimators in the literature that exploit this design: the adjusted 
matching estimator proposed by Dias et al. (2013); the semi-parametric IV estimator 
introduced by Battistin and Rettore (2008); and a standard parametric IV (2SLS) 
estimator. All three estimators rely on strategies that allow the identification of a local 
parameter. In our context we identify the average impact of the program on the 17-
years-old youths that choose (or are chosen) to enter the labor market as apprentices. 
Identification is achieved combining information on those who enter the labor market 
aged 18 years old with those 17-years-old youths that choose (or are chosen) to enter the 
labor market in other temporary jobs.  
We find that the program increases the chances of apprentices to get relatively better 
paid and more stable jobs, especially in the medium run – four and five years after the 
program. In particular, we find a very large impact on real wages that increase over 
time. We also find that the program is effective in increasing the probability of 
employment in a non-temporary job in the formal sector, especially in the medium run. 
The impact of the program on turnover is negative both in the short and in the medium 
run. On the other hand, we find a negative effect on accumulated formal labor market 
experience in the short run, which tends to vanish after 4-5 years.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief literature review on 
youth-targeted programs. In Section 3, we provide some institutional background, and 
describe the Apprenticeship program and the data set used in the study. Section 4 
discusses the estimation methods. Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review on Youth-Targeted ALMP’s 
Our paper is more closely related to a strand of the literature which studies whether 
youth-targeted programs affect the career prospects of young workers, in terms of either 
wage growth or a higher degree of labor market attachment. There is a wide variation in 
evaluation methods in the literature with just a few experimental studies adopted in 
some countries. Card et al. (2010) and Kluve (2010) summarize the findings of the 
evaluation of several ALMP’s in a large list of countries based on a meta-analytical 
framework. Both studies conclude that youth-targeted programs are less successful than 
other types of ALMP’s.  
Another important finding in the meta-analysis of Kluve (2010) is that ALMP’s have 
different impacts depending on the time horizon studied. Many training programs, for 
instance, have positive effects only two or three years after implementation. This 
underlines the advantage of using data that allows one to follow workers for a long 
period after the intervention as we do in this paper.9 
In another recent review of ALMP’s, Urzua and Puentes (2010) present evidence that 
youth-targeted programs tend to have better results in Latin American countries than in 
developed countries.10 This is consistent with a view that training programs should have 
more potential in low and middle-income countries since returns to skills are larger 
where skills are scarce.11  
In fact, three recent studies that exploit randomized experiments in two Latin American 
countries (Colombia and Dominican Republic) find positive impacts of the programs on 
some youth labor market outcomes, although results for the first wave of the Dominican 
Republic program are either not significant or modest when significant (Attanasio et al, 
2011; Card et al., 2011; Ibarrarán et al. 2012).12 
Attanasio et al. (2011) evaluate the youth-targeted training program Jóvenes en Acción 
which was introduced in Colombia between 2001 and 2005. They find sizable and 
significant impacts of the program for women on wages, formal wages, probability of 
employment, probability of formal employment, and hours worked. For men, the 
program only significantly affected the probability of formal employment and formal 
wages. They find very large effects on formal wages: 23% for men and 33% for women. 
Card et al. (2011) also exploits a randomized experiment to evaluate a youth-targeted 
training program introduced in the Dominican Republic in the early 00’s: Juventud y 
Empleo (JE). They find no significant impact of the program on employment and only 
modest impacts on wages and formality for men. They stress that the results could have 
been compromised by some flaws in the experiment design. Follow-up problems were 
observed with imperfect compliance and some crossover from control to treatment 
groups. 
                                                 
9 Biavaschi et al. (2012) also stress the importance of using better data for evaluating youth training 
programs. 
10 Attanasio et al. (2011) argue that the introduction of youth-training programs in middle and low-
income countries might have been discouraged by the mixed findings in the early literature for developed 
countries.  
11 Biavaschi et al. (2012) show that training provision is the primary form of ALMP in Latin America. 
12 Betcherman et al. (2007) review several impact evaluations of youth-targeted training programs in 
developing and developed countries. They also find that youth-training programs have on average more 
positive impacts in Latin America than in developed countries. 
Ibarrarán et al. (2012) evaluate a modified version of the JE program in the Dominican 
Republic. The second wave of the program had a larger sample and improved on the 
follow-up design. The authors do not find a significant impact of JE on employment but 
estimate a 7% impact on wages. They also find positive impacts of the program on non-
cognitive skills, such as leadership, conflict resolution, self-organization and persistency 
of effort; and show evidence that JE significantly reduced pregnancy rates.  
An important trend to be noticed in the recent literature on evaluation of youth-targeted 
programs is the use of better micro data and modern microeconometric methods for 
program evaluation. We review below some studies to provide a flavor of what has been 
recently done in the literature. 
Larsson (2003) uses propensity score matching methods to evaluate two youth programs 
(practice and training) in Sweden. He finds negative effects on earnings and 
employment one year after the intervention, with most coefficients becoming 
insignificant two years after the program.  
De Giorgi (2005) uses a regression discontinuity design exploiting an eligibility rule to 
evaluate the New Deal for Young People (NDYP), a major youth-targeted intervention 
in the UK that combines different aspects of ALMP’s (training, subsidized-
employment, and job-search assistance). He finds that the program significantly 
increased employability of participants. Dorsett (2006) evaluates which of the different 
aspects of the NDYP program was most effective in reducing unemployment of 
participants. He finds that subsidized employment was the most effective means of 
exiting unemployment compared to the other options of NYDP.13 
Centeno et al. (2008) evaluate a youth-targeted training program implemented in 
Portugal (InserJovem) in the late 1990s. They use a difference-in-difference estimation, 
exploiting the fact that the program was introduced only in some regions of the country, 
apparently for exogenous reasons. They find a negative impact: a very small effect of 
the program in increasing unemployment duration.  
Finally, Caliendo et al. (2011) investigate the effectiveness of several youth-targeted 
programs implemented in Germany, based on a matching method (inverse probability 
weighting) applied to administrative data from 2002 to 2008. In general, they find 
                                                 
13 See also Blundell et al. (2003) for an early evaluation of the NDYP program, in which a positive effect 
of the program on reducing unemployment in pilot areas was found.  
positive effects of most of the programs evaluated on the employment probabilities of 
participants. Wage subsidies are found to have the largest effects in the long run. 
As this brief literature review shows, despite the recent increase of studies using better 
data and more rigorous nonexperimental evaluations, evidence on the impacts of youth-
targeted training programs is still limited, especially in developing countries. 
 
3. Institutional Background and Data 
3.1. Training Programs in Latin America 
Vocational training has a long tradition in Latin America (Betcherman et al., 2007; 
Biavaschi et al., 2012). The first wave of training programs in the region started in the 
1940s and was inspired by the German apprenticeship model. In fact, the first 
vocational training program in Latin America was implemented in 1942 with the 
creation of Senai (Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial) in Brazil. In the 
following years, vocational training institutions (VTIs) were created in several Latin 
American countries. They usually had the explicit objective of providing skills in short 
supply to help the industrial sector to face the needs of an import-substitution 
development strategy. As Biavaschi et al. (2012) describe, these VTIs were “primarily 
supply-driven, state managed, financed through payroll taxes, independent from 
academic schools and from the Ministry of Education and usually quite close to the 
needs of the industry” (see also Moura Castro and Verdisco,1998). 
The incompatibilities of these institutions to adapt to the economic structural changes 
Latin American countries faced in the 1980s and early 1990s resulted in a second phase 
of vocational training policies in the region. Pioneered by a program implemented in 
Chile in the early 1990s, many new training programs targeted to disadvantaged youth 
were created throughout the region, the so-called Jóvenes Programs. Unlike early VTIs, 
these programs are managed in a more decentralized way and “place a heavy emphasis 
on the private sector, both as a provider of training and as a demander of trainees” (Card 
et al., 2011). 
The Brazilian experience has been less studied in the literature. Only in 2005 Brazil 
created a youth-targeted program in the lines of the Jóvenes Programs, called 
ProJovem.14 In 2008, ProJovem was expanded and integrated with other similar 
programs.15 On the other hand, in contrast with other Latin American countries, Senai 
has been able to somehow adapt to the new demand-driven challenges of the industrial 
sector and survived as the Brazilian main training institution. It is currently the largest 
educational network in Brazil.16 
The implementation of the Apprentice Act in 2000 constituted the main youth-targeted 
ALMP in Brazil. The program shares some similarities with the Jóvenes Programs 
introduced in other Latin American countries. For instance, it involves many non-
governmental organizations, philanthropy foundations, and private sector firms in 
several small-scale programs of training and placement of apprentices that are hired 
under the more general Apprenticeship program. On the other hand, Senai plays an 
active role in the program as the main provider of training.  
In the next sub-section, we describe the program in more detail. 
 
3.2. The Apprenticeship Program 
Youth-targeted programs usually combine characteristics of several categories of 
ALMP’s. The Brazilian Apprenticeship program is no exception to this rule. It is 
predominantly a professional training program. But it also has elements of other types 
of ALMP’s. As described below, the program concedes employment subsidies through 
a reduction in payroll and firing costs. It also facilitates job search of participants, since 
it involves a network of formal sector firms that access data on apprentices.17   
The Apprenticeship program has been part of the Brazilian labor legislation code CLT 
(Consolidação das Leis Trabalhistas) since 1943. However, it had a very small scope 
from 1943 to December 2000, when Law 11,180 - the Apprentice Act - was enacted. 
The program was initially designed for individuals aged 14 to 17 years old. It was 
                                                 
14 See Gonzalez (2009) for an overview of youth-targeted labor market programs in Brazil.  
15 See Silva and Andrade (2009) for a detailed description of ProJovem and recent changes introduced in 
this program.  
16 Senai is financed by payroll taxes and run by the National Confederation of Industry. Since its creation, 
about 42 million students have enrolled in Senai training schools. 
17 Note that the design of the program focuses on training, which seems to matter most for a developing 
country with low levels of schooling. By contrast, an apparently successful UK young workers program, 
the New Deal for Young People, focuses on job search assistance and subsidized job placement (Blundell 
et al., 2003). 
regulated in December 2005 by a more detailed legislation (Decreto-Lei 5598), when 
the maximum age for participation was increased from 17 to 23 years old. In 2010, 
around 200,000 workers had jobs under the program. The current Dilma Rousseff 
government works with a target of expanding it to one million young workers. 
Young workers hired under the Apprentice Act program are required to take formal 
training courses outside the firm. Training courses are provided by official professional 
qualification agencies - the so-called “S-System” (Senai, Senac, etc.) - or by training 
institutions certified by the Labor Ministry. If an apprentice has not yet completed 
primary school (an eight-year schooling stage), she is required to enroll at school.18 
The maximum number of working hours allowed for apprentices hired under the 
program is six hours per day for those still at primary school and eight hours per day for 
those with complete primary school. Payments must be at least the hourly minimum 
wage. There is a payroll subsidy in the form of a lower requirement of deposit on the 
worker’s FGTS account (Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço, a job-separation 
fund). Firms should deposit only 2% of the basic monthly wage on this fund, instead of 
the rate of either 8% or 8.5% that prevailed for other workers during that period.19  
Apprentices are hired under non-renewable fixed-term contracts with a maximum length 
of two years. As in other fixed-term contracts, there are no firing costs for job 
separations by the end of the contract.20  This is one of the main benefits for firms to use 
temporary contracts, since the standard procedure in cases of unjustified separations 
induced by firms is to pay a fine equivalent to 40% or 50% of the accumulated amount 
deposited in the FGTS account during the employment relationship.21  
                                                 
18 Despite the concern on school enrollment, the program has been criticized for including individuals 
with less than 16 years of age, which is prohibited by law in all other forms of labor contracts.  
19 Firms had to deposit 8% of the monthly wage on the worker's FGTS account from 1966 to October 
2001, when the government introduced a temporary increase of 0.5 percentage points which lasted for 
five years (Gonzaga, 2003). 
20 Contracts must be terminated when the apprentice reaches the age limit (18 years old between 2000 and 
2005, and 24 after 2005). The end of contract can be also anticipated in some exceptional cases, that 
include a non-adaptation or an insufficient performance of the apprentice in the training courses as 
attested by the certified training institutions (Ministerio do Trabalho e Emprego, 2006). 
21 The fine (to be paid to the worker) was 40% of the FGTS balance until October 2001, when it was 
permanently increased to 50%, with the additional 10 percentage points to be paid to the government. 
Since the FGTS fund approximately accumulates at the rate of one monthly wage per year, firing costs 
are around 50% of one monthly wage for each year of tenure. Almost all (more than 99%) firm-induced 
separations in Brazil are for unjustified reasons. 
Firms’ choices regarding the use of apprenticeship contracts are restricted by the 
following rule. A minimum of 5% (and a maximum of 15%) of the labor force 
employed in occupations requiring formal training should be composed of apprentices.22 
The inspection division of the Ministry of Labor is in charge of enforcement. 
Enforcement, however, is very low, especially in the early 2000s when firms could 
claim a lack of training agencies in the region/occupation they operate so as not to be 
penalized for employing less than the minimum amount required. Therefore, in practice 
the minimum threshold requirement was not binding in the period we analyze in this 
study. In particular, small firms tend not to hire workers under the program.23 
 
 
3.3. Data Description  
In this paper we use a very large restricted-access administrative file maintained by the 
Brazilian Ministry of Employment and Labor (Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego), the 
Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (RAIS). RAIS is a longitudinal matched 
employee-employer dataset covering by law the universe of formally employed workers 
in Brazil. All tax-registered firms have to report every worker formally employed at 
some point during the previous calendar year.24 Apart from tax/social security 
compliance the data has no coverage limitation, as opposed to other similar databases 
that are limited by geographical region, size, or industry. We use data from 2001 to 
2008. Over this period RAIS contains an average of 40 million worker-establishment 
records per year. 
Firm and worker identification numbers provide a natural way to construct a matched 
employer-employee longitudinal dataset. With the establishment identification number 
(CNPJ) it is possible to follow all establishments that file RAIS over time. With the 
worker’s national insurance number (PIS), it is possible to follow all workers that 
remain in the formal sector over time and to construct a panel of all matched 
establishment-worker pairs. 
                                                 
22 The list of occupations requiring formal training can be found in the Ministry of Labor website at 
http://www.mtecbo.gov.br/cbosite/pages/home.jsf. 
23 Note that small firms tend to be overrepresented in remote places with lower supply of training 
agencies and lower enforcement of labor legislation. 
24 There are incentives for truthful reporting since the main purpose of RAIS is to administer a federal 
wage supplement (Abono Salarial) to formal workers. 
Data on worker characteristics (age, education, gender) and establishment 
characteristics (industry, location at the municipality level) are available as well as 
detailed information for each employee-employer contract, such as wage, hours, tenure, 
month of admission, month of separation, reason of separation, occupation, type of 
contract (permanent or temporary, including whether it was an apprenticeship contract). 
There are two measures of wages: the average value over the year (or over the period of 
the year that the worker was with the firm) and the December wage. 
In order to exploit the age discontinuity of eligibility rules, we restrict the sample to 
workers who had their first jobs in the formal labor market at the ages of 17 or 18 years 
old in each of the first three years after the implementation of the Apprentice Act (from 
2001 to 2003). We only keep information for those youths that were hired for a fixed-
term (temporary) job. Apprentices hired under the Apprenticeship program constitute 
the treatment group, while other temporary workers are in the control group. In total, we 
have information on 11,366 apprentices (treatment) and 32,806 non-apprentices 
(control) that had their first jobs at the ages of 17 and 18 between 2001 and 2003.  
We follow all workers in our sample for five years (in addition to the entrance year). 
This allows us to compute average program impacts for the short run (arbitrarily defined 
as 1 to 3 years after the first formal job) and the medium run (4-5 years after first formal 
job). We find each worker in the sample in all formal (temporary and non-temporary) 
jobs in subsequent years and keep all information for each matched employee-employer 
pair.   
As in any study relying on longitudinal data, attrition is a crucial issue for our analysis. 
On average, RAIS’ attrition rate in any two consecutive years from our sample period is 
approximately 5%.25 One of the main sources of attrition in RAIS is due to occasional 
non-reporting by complier establishments. We identified several cases in which all 
employees from some establishments “disappear” from RAIS in a particular year and 
eventually return in subsequent years. We exclude these episodes of spurious 
establishments “births” and “deaths” from our sample. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Attrition rate is defined as the share of workers who are not found in a given year despite having been 
registered as employed on the last day of the previous year. 
3.4. Some evidence on scope, enforcement and compliance with the Apprentice program 
Table 1 presents the actual number of workers registered in RAIS as apprentices for all 
years from 1998 to 2010. The table reveals that: i) the number of apprentices 
substantially increased throughout the 2000s; ii) the majority of apprentices are 16 and 
17 year olds; iii) the age threshold of 18 years was respected between 2000 and 2005; 
and iv) the discontinuity at 24 years old after 2005 is not relevant with only a small 
number of apprentices aged 23 until 2008.26 
Table 1: Number of Apprentices by Age 
 
Source: Constructed by the authors based on microdata from RAIS. 
 
Although the number of workers employed as apprentices has grown steadily over the 
2000s, compliance was still very limited by the end of the decade. In 2010 only 1.5% of 
the establishments employed a number of apprentices in accordance with the minimum 
required by the Apprentice Act. Table 2 reports the shares of establishments, by 
establishment size, employing proportions of apprentices in the following ranges: no 
apprentices; more than zero but less than 5% of employees; between 5% and 15% (legal 
amount); more than 15%.27 The first line of the table shows that the share of small 
establishments (7 to 20 employees) employing no workers as apprentices is very high, 
                                                 
26 An informal conversation with an inspector from the Labor Ministry confirmed our prior that an 
apprenticeship job at age 23 is no longer attractive, which explains the declining number of apprentices as 
they approach that age. 
27 All quantities in Table 2 refer to the set of occupations requiring formal training, including the 
establishment sizes categories. 
Age 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
14 215 82 99 143 582 803 937 1291 1497 2125 2242 2369 2918
15 1063 984 724 1061 2781 5279 7387 8962 11656 13228 16115 16252 20907
16 1616 3145 2917 2684 5747 12365 20341 26060 29776 35100 39100 41787 50723
17 1262 3182 3617 2156 4547 9117 16266 21122 30160 34376 38871 42393 50654
18 70 34 54 76 48 79 121 1392 7052 12972 16317 21968 27846
19 27 1 0 0 0 0 0 246 2521 6687 9565 13145 17758
20 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 125 1396 3560 5804 8250 10464
21 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 72 832 1970 3307 4902 6470
22 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 403 1125 1793 2621 3366
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 193 439 674 1057 1320
24 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 25 31 51 77
25 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 28 35
26 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 24 27
27 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 30 43
28 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 17 25
29 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 23 28
30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 18 22
Total 4295 7428 7411 6120 13705 27643 45052 59365 85486 111582 133788 154744 192426
Number of Apprentices by Age
reaching 98.7%.28 This share decreases monotonically as establishment size increases, 
reaching 74.1% for the group of largest establishments (more than 500 employees). This 
confirms the claim of limited enforcement, in particular for smaller establishments. The 
third column of the table shows that the share of establishments employing the legal 
amount of apprentices varies from 0.9% to 3%, averaging 1.5% as previously 
mentioned. 
 
Table 2: Shares of establishments by proportion of apprentices and establishment size 
 
no 
apprentices 
0% -  5% 5% - 15% > 15% 
7 - 20 employees 98.7% 0.1% 1.2% 0.1% 
21 - 50 employees 93.9% 4.1% 2.0% 0.1% 
51 - 100 employees 84.9% 11.8% 3.0% 0.2% 
101 - 500 employees 75.5% 21.4% 2.6% 0.4% 
501 + employees 74.1% 24.5% 0.9% 0.5% 
Average 95.6% 2.8% 1.5% 0.1% 
Source: Constructed by the authors based on microdata from RAIS. 
 
Table 3 provides some information on enforcement from 1998 to 2011 provided by the 
Brazilian Ministry of Labor (MTE). The first column of the table shows the number of 
workers with labor contracts regularized after labor inspections conducted by MTE. One 
can see an upward trend until 2007 with a mild decrease afterwards. The second column 
displays the subset of labor contracts which were regularized as apprenticeship 
contracts. In contrast to the previous series, the number of regularized contracts of 
apprentices was very close to zero in the early 2000’s and has monotonically increased 
throughout the period. As a result the share of apprentices in labor contracts regularized 
due to inspections rose steadily from less than 0.5% in 2001 to almost 25% in 2011 (see 
last column).29 
  
                                                 
28 Establishments employing less than six employees in the set of occupations requiring formal training 
were excluded from our calculations. The reason is that for this group of establishments one apprentice 
would correspond to more than 15% of their employees. So in order to comply with the law the 
establishments in this group can’t employ any apprentice. 
29 Table 3 also shows that before 2000 the requirement to hire apprentices was not binding. This confirms 
our claim that despite the availability of the apprenticeship contract since 1943, the use of such contract 
only became a reality after the enactment of the Apprentice Act in 2000. 
Table 3: Labor contracts regularized due to labor inspections 
Year Total Apprentices % 
1998 261,274 - - 
1999 249,795 - - 
2000 525,253 850 0.2 
2001 516,548 1,919 0.4 
2002 555,454 11,111 2.0 
2003 534,125 18,146 3.4 
2004 708,957 25,215 3.6 
2005 746,272 29,605 4.0 
2006 670,035 44,049 6.6 
2007 746,245 52,676 7.1 
2008 668,857 55,637 8.3 
2009 588,680 68,926 11.7 
2010 515376 87,823 17.0 
2011 480,423 118,164 24.6 
Source: Department of Inspection, Labor Ministry (MTE) 
 
Summing up, this sub-section shows that the scope and enforcement of the 
Apprenticeship program are limited but are both rising throughout the years. The 
limited scope in the early 2000’s is beneficial for our evaluation purposes as general 
equilibrium issues were probably not relevant then. The rising in scope and enforcement 
of the Apprentice Act underscores the importance of a rigorous impact evaluation as an 
increasing amount of resources is being devoted to this program. 
 
4. Methodology and estimation procedures 
The main objective of this paper is to estimate the impact of the Apprenticeship 
program on labor market outcomes. As in many other similar studies, the main 
challenge in the absence of a randomized experiment is to separate causal effects from 
selection based on unobservables. In other words, the impact of the Apprenticeship 
program on youth employability is not trivially identified, since selection into the 
program is defined by firms and workers, and hence may be driven by unobservable 
characteristics. If these unobservable characteristics are not balanced among treated and 
non-treated workers, then methods relying solely on the comparison of the outcomes 
between the two groups produce misleading estimates. 
In order to get consistent estimates of the effect of the Apprenticeship program we make 
use of a set of three somewhat related estimators. In all three cases we exploit the fact 
that the eligibility to the program switches as age crosses a threshold value. 
The first is an estimator recently proposed by Dias et al. (2013), which combines the 
idea of matching on observables with exogenous variation provided by an instrument. 
The second is a semi-parametric version of the IV estimator applied to the context of a 
partially-fuzzy design as discussed by Battistin and Rettore (2008). The third is the 
traditional IV estimator, or 2SLS, also applied in a fuzzy design as discussed in Hahn et 
al. (2001).30  
We are able to identify and estimate a version of the ATT parameter regardless of the 
procedure we choose. This is the case even when using the IV estimators, which is 
usually associated to the LATE parameter in program evaluation. The reason is that by 
design those above the age-threshold cannot and do not participate in the program. In 
this situation the group of always-takers does not exist, implying that the treated group 
coincides with the complier group, the one for whom the effect is identified in the 
LATE parameter.31 In what follows we describe these estimators.  
 
4.1. Adjusted Matching 
In its ideal setting, the Dias et al. (2013) estimator uses an instrument which exploits 
boundary restrictions on eligibility rules based on individual characteristics (e.g., age, 
education, income). In this context, the instrument should drive participation into the 
program to zero for certain values of its domain and at the same time allows partial 
compliance for other values.32 The idea is that by moving individuals in and out of the 
                                                 
30 Hahn et al. (2001) relates the set of identification conditions in this context with those prevailing for the 
estimation of the LATE parameter, which in turn was proposed by Angrist and Imbens (1994). A 
summary on these topics can be found in Angrist and Pischke (2009). 
31 It is worth noting that in the setting of regression discontinuity design, as in the fuzzy designs we are 
dealing with in two of our estimators, identification is still local not because of the restriction to compliers 
but because of the validity around an age threshold. So we end up estimating a parameter that may be 
called a local average treatment on the treated (LATT). 
32 The Dias et al. (2013) approach is related to the partially-fuzzy regression discontinuity design 
proposed by Battistin and Rettore (2008). One of the main differences between the two approaches is that 
the former explicitly requires an exclusion restriction in the form of an instrument, while the latter is 
program the variation in the instrument can correct for possible unbalances in 
unobservables due to self-selection into the program. Note that the standard matching 
(on observables) method does not take care of such unbalance.  
To be more formal, we are interested in estimating the Average Treatment on the 
Treated (ATT) parameter: 
α = 1| = 1	 − 0| = 1	 = 	|1|,  = 1	 − |0|,  = 1	, 
where Y1 and Y0 represent individual potential outcomes associated with assignment to 
treatment and non-treatment, respectively, D measures the actual treatment status, with 
D = 1 (D = 0) corresponding to actual participation (non-participation) in the program, 
and X is a vector of conditioning covariates. The notation | means expectation 
over the X distribution for the D = 1 population.  
The object |1|,  = 1	 can be directly computed from the data through the 
mean of the outcome of interest among the treated group. However, as usual, the 
counterfactual object |0|,  = 1	 is not directly available in the data, so it 
needs to be identified through the use of some assumptions. Dias et al. (2010) propose 
an estimator of the counterfactual object based on the existence of a variable Z for 
which two features are assumed to apply: 
A1: 0 ⊥ |; 
A2: There exists a set of points ∗, ∗∗ in the domain of Z where for all	: 
 = 1, 	 = ∗ = 0 and 0 <  = 0|, 	 = ∗∗ < 1. 
 
The first assumption is an exclusion restriction that imposes that the variable Z is not 
correlated with the counterfactual outcome Y0 after conditioning on the covariates in 
X.33 Assumption 2 requires the existence of at least one value of Z that is capable of 
driving participation into the program to zero and at least another value for which 
participation is non-deterministic. It is interesting to note that these assumptions do not 
                                                                                                                                               
based on an assumption of continuity near the cutoff point. Also, while the latter approach is cast in terms 
of the LATE (Local Average Treatment Effect), the former is cast in terms of the ATT (Average 
Treatment on the Treated).  
33 In fact, that condition could be stated in terms of mean (conditional) independence. 
impose that there is no selective participation into the program. Indeed, they allow D to 
be correlated with Y0 when Z takes on the value z** (after conditioning on X). 
Using A1 and A2, Dias et al. (2013) propose a constructive proof for the identification 
of the mean counterfactual outcome 0|,  = 1	.34 They show that this object can 
be written as 
 
0|,  = 1	 = 0|,  = 0	 +
0│,  = ∗,  = 0	 − 0|,  = 0	
1 −  = 0|	
 
 
This expression shows that 0|,  = 1	 is equal to the mean 
outcome	0|,  = 0	, typically computed in matching estimation, plus what the 
authors call a correction term, which is given by the second term in the right hand side 
(RHS) of the equation. Note that all elements that compose this second term can be 
identified from the data, where 0│,  = ∗,  = 0	 is the mean observed outcome 
for ineligibles controls at given X and 1 −  = 0|	 is the propensity score. The 
object of interest 0| = 1		is finally identified from 0|,  = 1	 by averaging 
the latter over the distribution of X for the treated group (D = 1). 
We implement this estimator using age as the Z variable. This choice fits well in the 
ideal setting for the application of the Dias et al. (2013) estimator, since the eligibility 
rules of the Apprenticeship program impose a restriction on the maximum age for 
participation. As described in Section 4, the maximum age to participate in the program 
was 17 years old until September 2005, when the age restriction rose to 23. Recalling 
that the program is not compulsory, we have thus an appropriate setting in which the 
age of workers can be used as the instrument: while those aged above the cutoff value 
cannot participate, there is imperfect compliance for those below the cutoff.  
Estimation results will be presented for both the standard propensity score matching 
estimator and the so-called adjusted matching estimator (Dias et al., 2013). The 
covariates in X we use in the propensity score are dummies for gender, schooling, 
industry, occupation, geographical region, and the year in which the worker first entered 
the formal sector. The standard matching estimates were computed using Epanechnikov 
kernel weights. Only observations in the region of the common support of the 
                                                 
34 The proof can be found in Appendix 1.  
propensity score were used for computing standard and adjusted matching estimates.35 
Inference is based on standard errors estimated from bootstrap with 100 replications. 
 
4.2 Semi-parametric IV 
The age cutoff condition for eligibility in the Apprenticeship program fits directly into a 
framework of regression discontinuity design (RDD). In particular, it fits well the 
framework put forward by Battistin and Rettore (2008), where on one side of the 
eligibility threshold individuals are precluded from participating, while on the other side 
eligible individuals may self-select into the program. In fact, the main idea behind their 
estimator exploits the imposition of the non-participation condition near the threshold 
for eligibility to solve the selection problem. In our context, this implies that those aged 
18 years old will help identifying the average impact of the program on the 17 years old 
youths that choose (or are chosen) to become apprentices in the formal labor market. 
The fact that their framework is based on a design where on one side of the cutoff point 
there are ineligibles and on the other side there are eligible participants and eligible non-
participants configures what the authors call a partially fuzzy design.36 
To see how Battistin and Rettore’s (2008) estimator operates, let program eligibility be 
defined by an observable, continuous variable Z37 (age in our case). Let ̅ be the value 
of Z that defines the eligibility threshold, that is, the discontinuity point in the domain of 
Z below which individuals can participate in the program. Let ̅! and ̅" refer to the 
groups of individuals that are marginally below and above the cutoff point of eligibility, 
respectively. In our estimation, they are represented by workers with 17 and 18 years 
old, respectively. 
                                                 
35 Since the denominator of the correction term of the adjusted matching estimator is the estimated 
propensity score, estimates of the correction term can become quite imprecise for low values of the 
propensity score. Hence, following a suggestion in Dias et al. (2013), we asymmetrically trimmed the 
common support interval to be between the maximum of the 5th percentiles and the minimum of the 99th 
percentiles of the propensity score distributions of the treated and control groups.  
36 Typically in the RDD literature there are two types of designs: i) the sharp, where the probability of 
participation in the program changes from zero to one as the value of the eligibility variable crosses the 
threshold; and ii) the fuzzy design, where the change in the participation probability is less than one at the 
discontinuity threshold. The partially-fuzzy design combines features of these two designs. Classic recent 
references in the RDD literature are Hahn et al. (2001) and van der Klaauw (2002). 
37 In their paper this variable is denoted by “s”. We use “z” to be consistent with the notation in the 
previous section. 
Using the notation from the previous section, if # = 1 − 0 denotes the impact of the 
intervention, our interest centers in identifying the average treatment on the treated 
effect (ATT): #| = 1	, where  = 1 denotes program participation. Using the usual 
counterfactual notation, the observed outcome of any individual in the population can 
be written as 
 = 0 + ()#,  
where () is an indicator function of treatment status which explicitly recognizes that 
it depends on the variable Z. 
Consider the difference in mean outcomes |̅!	 − |̅"	. Using the previous 
expression, this difference can be rewritten as 
|̅!	 − |̅"	 = 0|̅!	 − 0|̅"	 + (&)#|̅!	 − (&)#|̅"	. 
By construction of the program design, those that are marginally ineligibles cannot 
participate (those who are 18 years old in our context). Hence, (̅") = 0 and the 
previous expression becomes: 
|̅!	 − |̅"	 = 0|̅!	 − 0|̅"	 + ()#|̅!	. 
The only condition needed to identify a local version of the parameter of interest is: 
C1: 0|	 is a continuous function of Z at ̅. 
This assumption, which is the main condition for identification of the mean impact of 
treatment for those at ̅! in the usual sharp RDD, simply requires that there is no 
discontinuity in counterfactual outcomes at the threshold for eligibility. It is typically 
considered a weak condition. 
Noting that ()#| = 0, ̅!	 = 0, we can write the last term of the previous 
expression simply as ()#|̅!	 = #| = 1, ̅!	.  = 1|̅!	. Now, by condition 
C1, 0|̅!	 = 0|̅"	, so the parameter of interest can be locally identified for 
individuals with  = ̅! (the group of 17 years old) by 
#| = 1, ̅!	 = 	 ()|*̅
+	!()*̅,	
-|*̅+	
  
Notice that all objects in the RHS of this expression can be computed from the data. In 
particular, the denominator can be seen as the propensity score for participation for 
those marginally eligible. In practice, it is calculated for this group using the same 
propensity score that was estimated for the adjusted-matching estimator of the previous 
section.38 For comparison purposes, inference is based on the same 100 bootstrap 
replications that were used in the computation of the adjusted-matching estimator. We 
also compute the partially-fuzzy estimator using the same common support of each 
replication of the adjusted matching estimator.  
 
4.3 Parametric IV 
As P[D=1|̅"] = 0 in our context, expression (1) above can be re-written as: 
 
#| = 1, ̅!	 = 	
|̅!	 − |̅"	
 = 1|̅!	
= 	
|̅!	 − |̅"	
 = 1|̅!	 − 	 = 1|̅"	
 
 
The last term is the traditional formula for the fuzzy regression discontinuity 
identification strategy, which in turn motivates the use of 2SLS estimation procedures 
by applied economists. Therefore we also use this estimator for the sake of 
comparability with a standard framework to deal with self-selection issues. We apply it 
in a fully parametric 2SLS framework, where a dummy for being 17 years old is used as 
the instrument for the apprentice’s treatment dummy. Note that this identification 
strategy could be applied even for a complete fuzzy design, whereas the two previous 
strategies rely on the partial fuzzy design formally expressed by assumption A.2 in 
section 5.1. 
 
  
                                                 
38 Mutatis mutandis, all objects presented in this section could be conditioned on the vector of observable 
characteristics X without changing the essence of the identification of the object of interest. 
5. Descriptive Statistics and Econometric Results 
In this section we show the results of the estimation of the impact of the Apprenticeship 
program on several labor market outcomes derived from applying the three 
identification strategies described in the previous section. Before turning to the results 
we discuss the plausibility of two important assumptions that permeate the identification 
strategies using some useful descriptive statistics. 
 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Two of the three methods we use in the paper are based on the partial participation of 
youths under 17 years old and the non-participation of youths over 18 years old. To 
confirm this, Figure 3 shows the participation rate in the Apprenticeship program by age 
for the period 2001-2003. The figure reveals that, although the probability of 
participation declines for eligibles, it is always positive below the 17 years old cutoff 
and becomes virtually zero for youths older than this threshold. Since the estimators we 
use are local, we only used information on youths aged 17 and 18 in all estimations.  
Figure 3: Participation rate in the Apprentice’s program by age – 2001/2003 
 
Source: Constructed by the authors based on microdata from RAIS. 
 
Another important identifying assumption relies on the comparison of unobservable 
characteristics between the 18-years-old and the 17-years-old groups. The precise 
statement of the assumption varies according to the method but one way or another they 
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require some sort of similarity in this comparison, which can also be stated in terms of 
the outcome variable in the absence of the program. In what follows we refer to this 
assumption as the exclusion restriction. This sort of comparison cannot be implemented 
with either variable. Some indirect evidence based on comparisons implemented with 
observable variables is usually provided by applied economists using such type of 
methods.  
Table 4 displays how observable characteristics are balanced among alternative groups 
for all temporary workers that had their first jobs at the ages of 17 or 18 years old 
between 2001 and 2003. Our sample has information on 11,366 apprentices and 32,806 
non-apprentices. 
We split the 17 years group in two sub-groups: the 11,366 workers hired under an 
apprenticeship contract and those hired under another type of temporary contract 
(10,138 workers). The results for these two sub-groups are shown in the first two 
columns of Table 4. The last two columns of the table compare the 17 years old group 
with the 18 years old (22,668 workers). A good balance for observed characteristics 
across groups would support our identifying assumption. 
The first row of the table shows that gender is balanced across groups, with a proportion 
of around two thirds of males in the sample. This equivalence between groups is not 
observed for the other characteristics reported in the remaining rows. We note, however, 
that in some cases differences may be induced by the program.  
Schooling distributions are very different when one compares the 18- and 17-years old 
groups. Differences in the bottom part of the schooling distribution, though, seem to be 
induced by the program, as the shares of non-apprentices in the first two schooling 
categories are very close to those registered for workers aged 18. Nonetheless, an 
important difference remains in the top part of the schooling distribution, as can be 
attested by the shares in the last two schooling categories: incomplete secondary school 
and complete secondary school. This is probably explained by the fact that the 
completion of secondary schooling in Brazil tends to occur in the students’ eighteenth 
year of life. 
  
Table 4 – Observable Characteristics: Temporary Workers, 1st Job at age 17 or 18  
 
Source: Constructed by the authors based on microdata from RAIS. 
The table also shows that the apprenticeship program is concentrated in non-agriculture 
activities. This is probably related to the logistics required for the implementation of an 
apprenticeship contract. Long commuting between workplaces and training centers can 
make this type of contract prohibitive for young workers in rural areas. It should be 
noted that a higher share of workers in the service activity within the 18 years old group 
persists even after comparing with the non-apprentices group.  
Occupational distributions are also not well balanced between groups. Apprentices are 
more concentrated in clerical and technical occupations compared to other forms of 
temporary contract. This is also the case when one compares the 17 and 18 year old 
groups. Finally, the table shows that the regional distribution of workers aged 18 seems 
to be more concentrated on the Northeast and less on the Southeast than for those aged 
Characteristics Apprentices Nonapprentices Age 17 - All Age 18 - All
Male 0.64 0.67 0.66 0.67
Schooling
  Less than 5 0.00 0.15 0.07 0.14
  6 to 8 0.11 0.22 0.16 0.20
  9 to 11 0.84 0.53 0.70 0.33
  More than 12 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.33
Industry
  Agriculture 0.00 0.23 0.11 0.20
  Construction 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
  Manufacturing 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03
  Trade 0.17 0.10 0.14 0.06
  Services 0.62 0.57 0.59 0.65
Occupation
  0.Armed forces 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
  1.Managers (public & private) 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
  2.Professionals 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
  3.Technicians 0.28 0.16 0.22 0.14
  4.Clerical 0.39 0.18 0.29 0.12
  5.Service and sales 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.11
  6.Agricultural 0.00 0.30 0.14 0.26
  7.Craft 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.13
  8.Machine operators 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.04
  9.Elementary occupations 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.17
Region
  North 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
  Northeast 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.16
  Southeast 0.70 0.66 0.68 0.60
  South 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.14
  Mid-West 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07
Sample size 11,366 10,138 21,504 22,668
Age 17
17. In this case the difference does not seem to be induced by the program, with similar 
numbers observed for apprentices and non-apprentices. 
Overall it seems fair to say that we cannot reject the hypothesis that in the absence of 
the program workers aged 17 and 18 would be similar. Although the table shows some 
important differences on observable characteristics between these workers, most of 
them seem to be induced by the program. This consideration reinforces the need for a 
method that takes into account a non-random selection of individuals into the program. 
The exclusion restriction deserves some further consideration. We want to stress that the 
sample used in the regression analysis is restricted to youth entering the labor market 
for the first time and hired under a temporary contract. We think the first restriction 
minimizes concerns of selection induced by employers since little (or nothing) is known 
about worker productivity except the characteristics that we are able to control for. 
Moreover even if you assume that employers are able to extract relevant information 
that may induce better opportunities for one or another group of workers, the last 
restriction tends to homogenize these opportunities, as everyone in the sample was hired 
under the same type of contract.   
Finally, one may argue that the 18th anniversary introduces a discontinuity in 
employability since individuals take more responsibilities at this age.39 However it 
should be stressed that we are comparing individual’s employability two to five years 
after the entrance year. Therefore we should expect that everyone in our sample would 
already have incorporated any discontinuous jump in employability experienced when 
they turned 18.40  
5.2. Econometric Results 
In this sub-section we present our estimates of the effects of the Apprenticeship 
program on several labor market outcomes, such as wage growth and measures of the 
degree of attachment to the formal labor market in subsequent years following the 
treatment for all three estimation procedures described in Section 4.  
The outcomes of interest can be classified in four groups of variables: i) formal 
employment probability (overall and for non-temporary jobs); ii) measures of 
                                                 
39 In Brazil 18 years old is a threshold defining criminal responsibilities and permission to drive vehicles. 
40 The outcome variables are compared when the youth who entered the labor market with 17 years old is 
about 19 to 22 years old. 
experience in the formal labor market (accumulated number of hours and months in 
formal sector jobs; probability of staying in the same firm or occupation); iii) measures 
of turnover (accumulated number of admissions and dismissals; probability of quits); 
and iv) real hourly wages. All impacts are estimated for the short run (2-3 years after the 
program) and the medium run (4-5 years after the program). 
Before presenting the econometric results, Table 5 displays the averages of the 
outcomes for the sub-groups in our sample analyzed in Table 4: apprentices; non-
apprentices age 17; 17 year olds; and 18 year olds. The last column presents the 
averages of all variables for the non-treated group of non-apprentices. 
Table 5 – Outcomes: Temporary Workers, 1st Job at age 17 or 18 
 
Raw comparisons of outcomes between apprentices (first column) and non-apprentices 
(last column) reveal that apprentices tend to have:  
• similar probabilities of being employed in a formal job both in the short and 
in the medium run (slightly less in the short run); 
• larger probabilities of being employed in a non-temporary formal job both in 
the short and in the medium run; 
• less accumulated hours and months worked in formal jobs both in the short 
and in the medium run; 
Outcomes Apprentices Non-apprentices Age 17 Age 18 Non-treated
Employment
Employment probability in years t+2 or t+3 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.77 0.76
Employment probability in years t+4 or t+5 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.73
Employment probability under a non-temporary job in years t+2 or t+3 0.68 0.55 0.62 0.57 0.56
Employment probability under a non-temporary job in years t+4 or t+5 0.71 0.58 0.65 0.58 0.58
Experience
Accumulated number of hours worked in years t+2 and t+3 1867 1749 1812 2026 1940
Accumulated number of hours worked in years t+4 and t+5 1740 1761 1750 1854 1825
Accumulated number of months worked in years t+2 and t+3 10.86 10.29 10.59 11.86 11.37
Accumulated number of months worked in years t+4 and t+5 10.03 10.24 10.13 10.80 10.63
Probability of staying in the same establishment in years t+2 or t+3 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.12
Probability of staying in the same occupation in years t+2 or t+3 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07
Turnover
Accumulated number of dismissals between years t+2 and t+3 0.59 0.81 0.69 0.88 0.86
Accumulated number of dismissals between years t+4 and t+5 0.53 0.75 0.63 0.75 0.75
Accumulated number of admissions between years t+2 and t+3 0.83 0.95 0.89 0.94 0.94
Accumulated number of admissions between years t+4 and t+5 0.58 0.79 0.68 0.79 0.79
Probability of dismissal by quit in years t+2 or t+3 0.22 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.24
Probability of dismissal by quit in years t+4 or t+5 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.25
Wages
Real hourly wage in year t 1.95 2.25 2.09 3.05 2.80
Real hourly wage in year t+1 2.28 2.67 2.45 3.40 3.17
Real hourly wage in year t+2 3.34 3.06 3.21 3.63 3.45
Real hourly wage in year t+3 3.82 3.52 3.68 3.94 3.81
Real hourly wage in year t+4 4.35 3.86 4.13 4.39 4.23
Real hourly wage in year t+5 4.89 4.28 4.55 4.78 4.63
Sample size 11,366 10,138 21,504 22,668
Age 17
• a smaller probability of staying in the same firm in the short run, but rates 
are very small for both groups (8% for apprentices and 12% for non-
apprentices); 
• a similar and very small probability (7%) of staying in the same occupation 
in the short run; 
• much lower turnover, with smaller accumulated numbers of dismissals and 
admissions both in the short and in the medium run; 
• a slightly lower probability of quitting; 
• a larger increase in real hourly wages over time: wages of apprentices were 
30% lower than of non-apprentices in year t but 6% larger by year t+5. 
Table 6 presents the estimation results for the average treatment effect on the treated 
parameter for the three estimation procedures discussed in Section 4. For comparison 
purposes, the first two columns display, respectively, the simple differences in outcome 
variables between treatment and control groups as reported in Table 5, and standard 
matching estimates based on propensity score.  
Columns 3, 4 and 5 present, respectively, the adjusted matching estimate proposed by 
Dias et al. (2013), the partially-fuzzy estimate proposed by Battistin and Rettore (2008), 
and a standard IV coefficient. The covariates used in the propensity score are dummies 
for gender, schooling, industry, occupation, geographical region, and the year in which 
the worker first entered the formal sector.41 
  
                                                 
41 We have also computed the correction term of the adjusted matching method, with its respective 
standard errors. Results are available upon request. 
 Table 6: Estimates of the Impact of the Apprenticeship Program on Selected Outcomes 
 
Notes: Column (1), raw differences, presents the simple differences in outcome variables between 
treatment and control groups as reported in Table 5. Standard matching (column 2) refers to propensity 
score matching based on an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.02. Adjusted matching (column 
3) adjusts column 2 with the correction term proposed in Dias et al. (2013). The covariates used for 
matching were dummies for gender, schooling, industry, occupation, geographical region, and the year in 
which the worker first entered the formal sector. Partially Fuzzy (column 4) is based on Battistin and 
Rettore (2008). The last column presents a standard IV estimation. The instrument for all estimates is a 
dummy that assumes value 1 (0) if the age of the worker is 17 (18). Standard errors (in parentheses) were 
computed from bootstrap with 100 replications.  
 
Raw
Outcomes Diffs Std_match Adj_match Part_fuzzy IV
Employment
Employment probability in years t+2 or t+3 -0.04 -0.027 -0.085 -0.102 -0.093
0.006 0.012 0.013 0.010
Employment probability in years t+4 or t+5 0.01 0.026 -0.023 0.013 0.007
0.006 0.011 0.012 0.010
Employment probability under a non-temporary job in years t+2 or t+3 0.12 0.062 0.068 0.100 0.046
0.006 0.017 0.017 0.011
Employment probability under a non-temporary job in years t+4 or t+5 0.13 0.088 0.104 0.177 0.110
0.007 0.017 0.017 0.011
Experience
Accumulated number of hours worked in years t+2 and t+3 -72.94 -95.61 -379.17 -491.63 -497.77
22.76 62.86 62.58 38.81
Accumulated number of hours worked in years t+4 and t+5 -85.27 101.04 -351.95 -53.88 -27.58
20.04 63.12 65.43 35.26
Accumulated number of months worked in years t+2 and t+3 -0.51 -0.541 -2.065 -2.693 -2.761
0.139 0.371 0.356 0.217
Accumulated number of months worked in years t+4 and t+5 -0.60 0.601 -2.044 -0.287 -0.141
0.104 0.350 0.348 0.197
Probability of staying in the same establishment in years t+2 or t+3 -0.04 -0.049 -0.058 -0.116 -0.102
0.004 0.009 0.010 0.007
Probability of staying in the same occupation in years t+2 or t+3 0.00 -0.031 0.021 -0.015 -0.021
0.004 0.010 0.010 0.006
Turnover
Accumulated number of dismissals between years t+2 and t+3 -0.27 -0.194 -0.371 -0.498 -0.368
0.013 0.032 0.033 0.024
Accumulated number of dismissals between years t+4 and t+5 -0.22 -0.083 -0.307 -0.253 -0.145
0.011 0.034 0.037 0.023
Accumulated number of admissions between years t+2 and t+3 -0.11 -0.054 -0.126 -0.143 -0.094
0.014 0.027 0.030 0.025
Accumulated number of admissions between years t+4 and t+5 -0.21 -0.066 -0.291 -0.227 -0.122
0.013 0.036 0.038 0.023
Probability of dismissal by quit in years t+2 or t+3 -0.02 -0.006 -0.005 0.021 0.015
0.008 0.019 0.023 0.017
Probability of dismissal by quit in years t+4 or t+5 -0.04 -0.027 -0.073 -0.049 -0.023
0.018 0.031 0.025 0.023
Wages
Wage variation (in R$) between t+2 and t 0.74 0.818 1.686 2.115 1.295
0.063 0.205 0.234 0.137
Wage variation (in R$) between t+3 and t 0.86 0.848 1.887 2.472 1.616
0.056 0.199 0.218 0.129
Wage variation (in R$) between t+4 and t 0.98 0.786 1.947 2.391 1.454
0.143 0.236 0.301 0.200
Wage variation (in R$) between t+5 and t 1.12 0.499 2.963 2.673 1.992
0.321 0.492 0.433 0.358
Results in Table 6 are organized as in Table 5 for the four groups of outcomes of 
interest: employment probability, experience, turnover, and wages. The results in the 
last three columns of the table show that the impact of the Apprenticeship program was:  
• negative and statistically significant on the probability of being employed in 
a formal job in the short run (two or three years after the program); 
• not statistically significant on the probability of being employed in a formal 
job in the medium run (four or five years after the program) according to the 
last two estimates, while the adjusted matching estimate was negative and 
significant, although small; 
• positive and statistically significant on the probability of being employed in 
a non-temporary formal job both in the short and in the medium run, with 
much larger estimates (from 10.4 to 17.7%) for the medium run; 
• negative and statistically significant on accumulated hours and months 
worked in formal jobs in the short run; 
• not significant on accumulated hours and months worked in formal jobs in 
the medium run according to the last two estimates, while the adjusted 
matching estimate was negative and significant; 
• negative and statistically significant on the probability of staying in the same 
firm in the short run (estimates in the range of -5.8% to -11.6%); 
• mixed and small on the probability of staying in the same occupation in the 
short run (estimates in the range of -2.1% to 2.1%); 
• negative (large in absolute terms) and statistically significant on the 
accumulated numbers of dismissals and admissions both in the short and in 
the medium run; 
• not significant on the probability of quitting in the short run; 
• negative and significant on the probability of quitting in the medium run, 
with the exception of the standard IV which renders insignificant estimates; 
• positive, large and statistically significant on real hourly wages levels both in 
the short and in the medium run. Estimates vary from R$1.30 to R$2.12 in 
year t+2, and increase with the time horizon, varying from R$2.0 to R$ 2.97 
in year t+5. These numbers correspond to substantial increases with respect 
to the average real hourly wages of apprentices in year t which was R$1.95.  
Note that these findings are very similar across estimation procedures. 
Altogether the results suggest that the program is capable of increasing the 
employability of apprentices. In particular, the program has a large impact on real 
wages. It is also very effective in increasing the probability of treated youth of being 
employed in a non-temporary job in the formal sector, especially in the medium run. 
We also find a much lower turnover for participants in the program both in the short and 
in the medium run. On the other hand, we find a negative effect on accumulated formal 
labor market experience in the short run, which tends to vanish after 4-5 years.  
These findings are compatible with the interpretation that the program increases either 
the reservation wage or the “reservation job quality” of participants. As a result 
apprentices tend to spend relatively more time in the short run searching for stable/high 
wage jobs, possibly as non-employed. After a while they tend to find these better-
quality jobs.  
This interpretation goes in line with: i) slightly lower employability in the short run; ii) 
higher chances of getting a non-temporary contract both in the short and medium run; 
iii) lower levels of experience in the short run, but not in the medium run; iv) lower 
turnover in the short and in the medium run; and vi) higher real wages that increase over 
time. 
 
 
6. Concluding comments 
Youth-targeted ALMPs have been implemented all around the world, reflecting 
evidence of scarring effects of early unemployment experiences. In developing 
countries the focus has been on training programs which make sense given a general 
scarcity of skills. However, there are just a few evaluations of the effectiveness of 
youth-training programs in developing countries in the literature.  
We provide a first evaluation of the Apprentice Act, a subsidized youth-targeted 
training ALMP that has been implemented in a large scale in Brazil since 2000. We 
make use of a very large restricted-access longitudinal matched employee-employer 
dataset (Rais, Relatório Anual de Informações Sociais), based on administrative data 
collected by the Labor Ministry, that contains information on the employment histories 
of all formal workers in Brazil from 1998 to 2010. We measure the impact of the 
program on four groups of outcomes that represent formal labor market attachment and 
remuneration, using other temporary workers as a control group. The analysis is carried 
on for the short run (two and three years after the program) and the medium run (four 
and five years after the intervention). 
We employ three distinct estimation procedures which deal with self-selection by 
exploiting a discontinuity by age in the eligibility to the Apprenticeship program. Our 
main estimator is the one proposed by Dias et al. (2013), which is an adjusted matching 
estimator that corrects the standard matching approach with an IV estimated correction 
term based on a sharp observed cutoff criterion. For robustness purposes we also use a 
partially-fuzzy regression discontinuity estimator due to Battistin and Rettore (2008) 
and a standard parametric IV. 
We find that the program increases the employability of apprentices. In particular, we 
find a very large impact on real wages that increase over time. We also find that the 
program is effective in increasing the probability of employment in a non-temporary job 
in the formal sector, especially in the medium run. The impact of the program on 
turnover is negative both in the short and in the medium run. On the other hand, we find 
a negative effect on accumulated formal labor market experience in the short run, which 
tends to vanish after 4-5 years.  
These results are robust to our choice of methods that deal with selection into the 
program, holding for the whole set of estimation procedures. 
  
Appendix: Identification Result in Dias et al. (2010)  
This appendix informs the reader how to use assumptions A1 and A2, described in 
section 5.1 above and reproduced below, to reach the identification of the counter-
factual component of the ATT parameter. The identification conditions are: 
A1: 0 ⊥ |; 
A2: There exists a set of points ∗, ∗∗ in the domain of Z where for all : 
 = 1,   = ∗ = 0 and 0 <  = 0|,   = ∗∗ < 1. 
Following Dias et al. (2010), we first have that 
 
0|	 = 0|, 	 
                 = 0|, ,  = 0	 = 0|, 	 + 0|, ,  = 1	 = 1|, 	 
                 = 0│,  = ∗,  = 0	, 
where the first equality comes from A1. The second equality holds for any z, in 
particular for Z = z*. Hence the third inequality comes from A2 when Z = z*. 
Since it is always true that  
0|	 =  0|,  = 0	 = 0|	 + 0|,  = 1	 = 1|	, we can write 
 
0|,  = 1	 =
0|	 − 0|,  = 0	.  = 0|	
 = 1|	
=  
0│,  = ∗,  = 0	 − 0|,  = 0	.  = 0|	
 = 1|	
, 
where the last equality comes from the previous result. Now, with some algebraic 
manipulation of the last expression we obtain that 
0|,  = 1	 = 0|,  = 0	 +
0│,  = ∗,  = 0	 − 0|,  = 0	
1 −  = 0|	
 
This expression corresponds to equation (4) in Dias et al. (2010).  
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